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ABSTRACT 
Embedded systems are critically relying on the integrity its input and output signals to 
ensure proper operation. Signal from sensors, either analog or digital, are blindly trusted by 
the embedded systems, to estimate the environment, in which the system is set to monitor 
and respond to. Similarly, actuators, that are connected to and controlled by an embedded 
system, are expected to behave in a reliable manner, to perform a particular physical motion. 
However, recent publications, from hardware security researchers, have shown that sensor 
signals can be manipulated by injection of false data, using intentional electromagnetic 
interference (IEMI). In this work, the author proves that both the input as well as the output 
signals of an embedded system are vulnerable to data manipulation, via physical layer of this 
system, which would bypass any traditional defense mechanism. 
By using specially crafted IEMI attack techniques, this work has shown that the 
physical layer input/ output signals can be manipulated by an attacker, thereby providing the 
attacker, with the ability to remotely control an embedded system. Three different attack 
scenarios had been analyzed and the effectiveness of the attack against each scenario has 
been experimentally verified. First, an embedded system, gathering data through an analog 
sensor, was manipulated to output arbitrary sensor data, while in the second scenario, a 
slightly modified attack technique, has been shown to successfully inject false data into 
digital communication lines. Finally, commonly used digital actuators, which were controlled 
by embedded system, has been shown as a potential target for false data injection attack, 
using IEMI techniques. These attacks have been shown to be effective, at appreciable 
distances from the victim circuit, while using attack signals with relatively less power.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a society which is increasingly concerned with privacy, securing their information 
from malicious hackers and prying government eyes, security for its data in the hardware and 
software is of utmost importance. Software data security is an ever-evolving process, in 
which attack and defense techniques change day-by-day. But, for most consumers, hardware 
security is a tough option to upgrade, every now-and-then. Hence, any hardware, especially 
electronic devices, needs to have foresight, in securing against potential threats in the future, 
to provide a trustworthy platform, for its consumers. There are several attack techniques 
targeted at exploiting the security vulnerabilities present in a hardware circuit, one of which 
is intentional electromagnetic interference attack technique.  
Intentional Electro-Magnetic Interference (IEMI) attack is a rising new technique which 
works by intentionally inducing noise, thereby disrupting the normal operation of a system, 
or injecting false data into commonly used electronic systems, thus presenting the attacker 
with the ability to independently control the electronic system. It is of utmost importance to 
understand the potential risks this new attack technique possesses, before developing suitable 
countermeasures, to protect future generation of electronic devices, against threats posed by 
IEMI attacks. 
Research community’s interest in IEMI attack peaked when a formal definition was 
defined for this attack technique. In February 1999, at Zurich EMC Symposium, IEMI attack 
got its definition as “Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing 
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noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging 
these systems for terrorist or criminal purpose” [1].  
Previous work on IEMI attacks focuses predominantly on potential threat from High 
Power Electro-Magnetic (HPEM) signals [2] [3]. The most interesting investigation into 
electronic system failures and anomalies due to HPEM sources, was performed by NASA, 
which shows several past occurrences of failures in automotive, aircraft and medical 
equipment due to EM sources [2]. This report mentions occurrence of power failure in a U.S. 
Navy vessel, due to HPEM signal transmission. This caused an oil pressure sensor to falsely 
sense a low reading and caused a power failure in the Navy vessel [2]. Although it might 
seem that accidental damage due to HPEM signals are minimal for civilians, the next 
incident would prove otherwise. Mercedes-Benz cars suffered Anti-locking Braking System 
(ABS) related problem on a certain stretch of German autobahn, due to HPEM signal 
emission from a near-by radio transmitter [2]. Even complex medical equipment are 
susceptible to HPEM signals, as reported by a problem in an Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
machine during a surgery, whose output was corrupted with HPEM signal, coupled from a 
local AM radio station [2]. This investigation by NASA, presents many more interesting 
instances of HPEM related anomalies in the past. 
 A more comprehensive analysis on the state of contemporary IEMI attack research has 
been peformed by Radasky et al., who have highlighted the potential new threat this new 
attack technique possesses to our modern civil society and listed the four major topics in 
which researchers focuses on [4]: 
1) IEMI waveform generation capability and classification of the type of sources [5] [6] [7]. 
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2)  Electromagnetic (EM) coupling process with cables and systems [8] [9] [10]. 
3) Impact of IEMI on electronic and communication systems [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]. 
4) Development of protection techniques, along with design of measurements and standards 
[17] [18] [19].  
Out of these topics, the research involving the impact of IEMI on electronic and 
communication systems, is the most relevant area to the work described in this dissertation. 
In this work, Radasky et al., has summarized the work of Camp et al., who investigated the 
breakdown behavior of microcontrollers when they were subjected to Electromagnetic Pulse 
(EMP) [11]. They have determined that the susceptibility of microcontrollers to EMP 
depends predominantly on the signal line lengths. Also, Backstrom et al. work has been 
presented, which discusses in detail regarding the vulnerabilities in systems like missiles, 
tactical radio link, army radio, cars, computers, telecom stations and generic objects, to 
HPEM sources [14]. These authors have described that at frequencies below 2.8 GHz, high 
power (10 MW) IEMI attack is feasible at even a kilometer away from the EM source [14]. 
They have also explored the possibility of building a homemade IEMI transmitter which 
could damage electronic circuits, just like an HPEM radiation would, from a nuclear blast or 
high-power EMP [14].  
In most of these research publications on EM attacks, shielding the exposed circuit 
components, cables and printed circuit board traces, has been proposed as a viable option to 
defend against high power EM interference attacks. But, C. Paul suggests that shielding 
against IEMI attack is extremely difficult, under near-field conditions [20]. Before 
understanding the reason for shielding ineffectiveness against near-field EM sources, it is 
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important to understand the difference between near-field and far-field of an antenna/EM 
source. 
1.1 Near-field shielding 
A simple definition for near-field would be, the region around the antenna/EM source 
where the intensity of electric and magnetic fields does not vary inversely proportional to the 
distance from the antenna/EM source. Another definition for near-field defines it as, the 
distance from the antenna/EM source, where the ratio of electric field to magnetic field 
components is not approximately equal to the characteristic impedance of the medium, in 
which radiation occurs. C. Paul claims that for the far-field assumptions to hold in an 
experiment, one must be far enough away from the antenna, by an order of three times the 
wavelength of the signal emitted from that antenna [20]. 
Figure 1-1 shows the wave impedance plots of a) electric dipole and b) magnetic dipole, 
where wave impedance was defined as the ratio of electric field intensity Eφ to the magnetic 
field intensity Hθ. This figure shows that the electric dipole behaves like a high-impedance 
source, while the magnetic dipole behaves like a low-impedance source, under near-field 
distances. Due to these impedance variation, the effectiveness of shielding does vary quite 
drastically, as suggested by the data in Figure 1-2.  
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Figure 1-1 Wave impedance of a) electric dipole b) magnetic dipole [20] 
Shielding effectiveness can be measured in terms of the electric field intensity and the 
magnetic field intensity absorbed as well as reflected by the shield, with respect to the field 
intensities that encounters this shield [20]. Although, the absorption loss provided by the 
shield is unaffected under near-field or far-field conditions, the reflection loss introduced by 
the shield varies drastically, depending on the location of shield in the near-field or far-field 
of the antenna/EM source. 
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Figure 1-2 Reflection loss introduced by shields under near-field condition of electric and 
magnetic sources [20] 
Figure 1-2 shows that the reflection loss provided by shields, under near-field condition, 
against magnetic sources, are far lower than the losses under far-field condition. Figure 1-2 
also shows that, the reflection loss is relatively lower for any frequency, when the distance 
between the magnetic source and shield is in order of fractions of the wavelength of the 
signal being transmitted. This variation in the shield’s reflection loss occurs due to the low 
impedance near-field region which exists around a magnetic source. According to the data 
shown in Figure 1-2, EM radiation from a simple loop antenna, which is an example of a 
magnetic source, can become extremely difficult to shield against, especially under low 
frequencies. Since, shielding techniques are relatively inefficient against near-field IEMI 
attacks, alternative methods must be investigated, to protect against this malicious attack 
technique. 
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1.2 Data security in embedded system 
Despite the existing vulnerabilities in the current generation of electronic devices from 
IEMI attacks, the society is willingly accepting these devices into every aspect of their lives. 
Tech giants like Apple, Google and Amazon have invested hugely on creating the next 
generation of smart home devices, which would result in placing a computer into everything 
in our homes [21]. These devices consist of embedded systems built inside them, which can 
connect to the internet and automate day-to-day tasks like watering the plants, turning on/off 
air-conditioning system, locking/unlocking keyless smart doors and many more. Ultimately, 
these technology advancements tend to find their way into our lives, without fully securing 
themselves against existing security risks.  
Embedded circuits are predominantly relying on sensors to gather information about a 
system and use that information to maintain/influence its operation. Automobiles are an 
excellent example of such an embedded system. The on-board embedded system in a car 
relies on a myriad of sensors to estimate the vehicle’s speed, tire pressure, fuel level, 
condition of Anti-Locking Braking System (ABS), engine temperature, Vehicle Stability 
Control (VSC), etc. Securing these sensor’s data from malicious attacks is critical to maintain 
the proper operation of the vehicle as well as to keep the driver and passengers safe.  C. 
Miller and C. Valasek proved that a 2014 Jeep Cherokee could be remotely hacked and 
controlled by injecting malicious messages into the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus of 
the car through internet [22]. This attack was feasible due to the internet connected head unit 
(Radio) present in that car. Although Chrysler issued a recall to install a software patch to 
counteract the vulnerabilities exposed by C. Miller and C. Valasek [23], this attack shows the 
potential danger that security vulnerabilities in an embedded system poses to its users. 
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Traditionally, researchers have been focusing on securing the embedded systems by 
encryption of data, to prevent attacks from hackers [24] [25]. Embedded systems digitize the 
sensor data using an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC), after which the sensor data could be 
encrypted. Despite ensuring data security in embedded system by encryption, these systems 
are designed to implicitly trust the data received from sensors. Similar vulnerability exists in 
the actuators controlled by embedded systems, such as servo motors. In digital servo motors, 
the on-board microprocessor trusts the control signal received from an embedded system and 
uses this information to change the position of the actuator. Thus, both sensors and actuators 
connected to an embedded system are vulnerable to malicious data injection attacks. 
Intentional Electro-Magnetic Interference (IEMI) attack has the potential to exploit this 
security vulnerability in sensors and actuators and inject malicious data into the embedded 
system. IEMI attacks has not yet been explored thoroughly enough to investigate the 
potential threat to embedded systems. Although it is a well-known fact that usage of 
enormous amount of Electro-Magnetic (EM) power, in the range of kilowatts, for an attack 
could essentially destroy an embedded system, attack from low power EM signal (watts) 
have the potential to manipulate the control signal to and from an embedded system [26] 
[27].  
Recently low power IEMI attack techniques have gained interest among researchers 
[28] [29]. Shoukry et al. discussed a non-invasive attack on Antilock Braking System (ABS) 
in cars, using IEMI attack technique [29]. They have proved that an attack using magnetic 
field, which could overpower the magnetic field signal generated by the ABS sensor, 
resulting in a successful injection of an attack signal, without physically tampering with a 
circuit [29]. Since the ABS sensor tries to read the vehicle speed, injecting false magnetic 
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field signal would corrupt the integrity of the ABS sensor output. But, the attack technique 
described in this work, will only work on sensors which can measures magnetic fields.  
The most relevant work in low power IEMI attack has been described by Kune et al. 
[30]. The authors have tried injecting EM signal into pace-maker, at the same frequency as 
the baseband signal. Since the attack signal lies in the same band as the baseband signal, the 
onboard filters cannot attenuate the attack signal [30]. Authors have claimed this method of 
attack to be successful at a maximum distance of 1.57m from an EM signal transmitter.  
1.3 System level overview of IEMI attack 
The work presented in this dissertation focuses on utilizing IEMI attacks techniques 
to inject false data into sensors and actuators, while using significantly less power (in the 
order of couple of watts), in comparison to HPEM attacks.  
 
Figure 1-3 IEMI attack model showing the attacker circuit as well as circuits under attack 
[31] 
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Figure 1-3 shows the IEMI attack model used for injecting false data into embedded 
systems using sensors and actuators. In the attack model described in this figure, it was 
assumed that an attacker will be armed with a signal generator, amplifier and an antenna, 
with a goal of injecting false data into the path of sensor signal, which travel towards an 
embedded system, and into the path of control signal generated by the embedded system, 
which travel towards an actuator. The circuits on the right side of this figure, represents the 
embedded system connected to a sensor and an actuator. The 𝑉𝑎𝑡𝑘(𝑡) represents the voltage 
induced at the embedded circuit, due to the transmission of an attack signal generated with a 
current amplitude of ∫ 𝑉𝑎𝑡𝑘(𝑡)𝑑𝑡, at the attacker circuit. The significance of the integral sign 
in the amplitude of current, will be discussed in the upcoming chapters. On the circuits under 
attack, 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑡 represents the voltage signal generated by the sensor, to be read by an embedded 
system or the voltage signal generated by the embedded system, to be read by an actuator. 
Finally, 𝑉𝑚 represents the net voltage signal received by the embedded system or the 
actuator. In a successful IEMI false data injection attack, the induced voltage 𝑉𝑎𝑡𝑘(𝑡) would 
be large enough to make significant modification to the net voltage signal , 𝑉𝑚. 
1.4 Overview of the dissertation 
This dissertation has been subdivided into chapters about IEMI attack techniques on: 
1) Analog sensors 
2) Digital sensors 
3) Digital Actuators 
Analog sensors convert a physical quantity into a current or voltage signal, which can 
later be converted into digital data to be processed by an embedded system. The conversion 
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of the electrical signal from the analog to digital domain is handled by the analog to digital 
converter circuit. Due to the non-linearity present in the input terminals of an embedded 
system, the induced time varying signal, intentionally coupled by an attacker, could get 
converted into Direct Current (DC) domain and corrupt the integrity of electrical signal from 
sensor. This chapter discusses the nature of the non-linearity present at the input terminals of 
embedded system, along with techniques to induce a false data, aimed to corrupt the actual 
signal generated from the sensor. A photo-diode based sensor circuit was chosen to serve as 
the circuit under an IEMI attack. Since the IEMI attack technique used to inject false data 
into analog sensors, rely on non-linear properties of the embedded system, to induce a 
tangible effect towards corrupting the sensor data, this attack technique would work on any 
type of analog sensor, regardless of its type (voltage/current output). 
In the next chapter, digital sensors were considered as the target for false data 
injection attacks using IEMI technique. Mainly, the digital sensors connected to embedded 
system’s General Purpose Input/ Output (GPIO) pins, has been considered as the system 
under an IEMI attack. Due to the high logic level amplitudes used by the digital circuits, they 
were previously considered to be immune to IEMI attacks. But, due to the non-linear 
properties of the embedded system’s input terminal, this attack technique can induce random 
false data into the digital output signal path. To deterministically induce false data into these 
systems, special type of waveforms has been discussed and provided experimental proof, that 
these waveforms can induce deterministic false signal.  
The last chapter on IEMI attacks investigates false data injection techniques for 
digital actuators. Since, digital actuators are controlled by embedded systems, using Pulse 
Width Modulation (PWM) signals, any attack signal aimed at deterministically inducing false 
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pulse width data into this system, must be in phase with the PWM signal. These digital 
actuators use onboard microcontrollers to determine the incoming periodic PWM signal’s 
pulse width and use that information to make a physical motion. This chapter explores 
different waveform options to deterministically inject false pulse widths into the periodic 
PWM signal, thereby giving the attacker, the ability to make a physical motion of their 
liking, with the digital actuator. Also, techniques to disable the digital actuator, from 
responding to any new control signals, has also been investigated in this chapter. This chapter 
also explores, circuit design techniques used for transmitting these special waveforms, 
targeting digital sensors, attached with embedded system. 
The final topic has been dedicated to the initial project, in which the author had gotten 
an opportunity to work on a magneto-optic switching circuit. This circuit helps optimize all-
optical routers, which were aimed at circumventing the latency issues, introduced by the 
current generation of optical-to-electrical and electrical-to-optical network router 
infrastructure modules. This magneto-optic switching circuit was small magnetic pulse 
generator circuit, used to change the polarization state of magneto-optic materials, which can 
act as an optical ON/OFF switch, thus functioning as an optical router. The proposed circuit, 
in this chapter, has been proven to function better than the previous circuits, aimed at 
performing the same switching functionality. 
The main contributions of the author from this research work are as follows: 
1. Design of false data injection techniques to induce DC signal into the input/output signals 
of the embedded system. The attack techniques described in this work, can be used by an 
attacker, to inject false data into an embedded system, thereby hacking the system, to 
perform tasks, as dictated by the attacker. These attack techniques rely on exploiting the 
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non-linear properties present in the embedded systems and thus do not restrict themselves 
to few the type of sensor or embedded circuits, which were described in this work.  
2. Pioneering research work performed on injecting false data into digital actuator control 
signals. At the time of writing this dissertation, to the best of the knowledge of the author, 
no other research team has published work on attacking digital actuators using IEMI. 
Author and his team had previously published this work, with experimental results 
proving that it is possible to arbitrarily reduce the pulse width of the PWM control signal. 
But in this dissertation, the author has proved, that it is also possible to arbitrarily 
increase the pulse width of the PWM signal. With this attack technique, any digital 
actuator, controlled by an embedded system, via PWM control signal, could be hacked 
and forced to make a motion, according to the instruction provided by the attacker. 
3. A simplified enhancement solution has been proposed by the author, for magnetic pulse 
generator circuit, used to generate bidirectional magnetic field. The proposed circuit 
significantly reduces the size of the magnetic pulse generator circuit, in comparison to the 
previous generation of circuits. 
 The author hopes that by understanding the potential threats posed by IEMI attack 
techniques to our civil society, future researchers would show increased interest, in building 
next generation of embedded systems, which are secured against this malicious false data 
injection technique. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FALSE-DATA INJECTION FOR ANALOG SENSORS 
 
Embedded systems use analog sensors to convert real-world signal such as light, 
temperature, humidity, etc, into electrical signal (voltage or current), which can be 
interpreted by digital electronic systems. The part of the embedded system which reads this 
electrical signal from sensors is the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). As mentioned 
earlier, the electrical signal from sensors are vulnerable to attack from IEMI attacks.  
The success of an IEMI attack depends on the amount of EM signal coupled to the victim 
embedded circuit which is under attack. The coupled EM signal strength can be increased by 
determining the frequency at which the victim circuit is most susceptible to accept the 
incoming EM signal, which is usually its self-resonant frequency. Since any closed circuit is 
a loop, it can be approximated as a loop antenna. Thus, an ADC connected to analog sensor 
which becomes a closed circuit, can effectively receive EM signal transmitted at its resonant 
frequency.  
In this section we illustrate false data injection into an ADC receiving data from a photo-
diode based Infra-Red (IR) light sensor, using IEMI attack technique. An IR light sensor was 
used, since it is a commonly used sensor in solar energy harvesting system as well as 
automated ambient light controlling system. This sensor outputs a DC current proportional to 
the ambient IR light, which is typically in the order of tens of micro amperes [32], which is 
representative of many sensors used in embedded systems. By injecting false data into the 
embedded system controlling solar energy harvest or ambient light, the attacker could make 
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the system malfunction, by making the system overuse its energy storage, resulting in a 
system failure. 
This IEMI attack on a IR light sensor is representative of many different sensors 
connected to an embedded system, since the attack primarily exploits the non-linear 
properties of embedded systems, to induce a tangible false data and does not depend on the 
type of sensor. 
2.1 Mechanism of Attack 
 The most effective way to attack an analog sensor with IEMI attack would involve 
transmission of narrow-band sinusoidal signal and direct it towards the victim embedded 
circuit. This would induce an AC signal on the victim circuit. The author hypothesize that 
narrow-band signals would be most effective for an attacker, due to the reduction in 
complexity of the attacker circuit by designing the circuit to operate only at the resonant 
frequency of the victim circuit. Although it is counter-intuitive to inject AC signal into the 
input of ADC, which reads DC signal generated from the sensor, the induced AC signal can 
get rectified by the non-linear properties of the ADC input, thereby producing an DC signal 
injection. 
 Non-linearity in the input terminal of the ADC could be predominantly attributed to 
the Electro-Static Discharge (ESD) protection circuit [33]. Integrated Circuits (IC) are highly 
susceptible to permanent damage due to the high voltage introduced by ESD. To protect the 
ICs from this damage, manufacturers build ESD protection circuits at the Input/ Output (IO) 
pins of the ICs, which shunts the high voltage to positive or negative power supply terminals, 
with the help of diodes. Shunting the high voltages from reaching the internals of an IC, 
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prevents damage due to ESD. Inadvertently, these ESD protection circuits introduces signal 
degradation under high frequency and high amplitudes [33].  
During an IEMI attack, the ESD protection diodes could be performing rectification 
of AC signal, which was coupled from the attacker, into DC signal. Figure 2-1 shows an 
example of ESD protection circuit, present between the input terminal of an ADC and its 
internal circuitry. In this particular ESD protection circuit, shown by Figure 2-1, which are 
actually being used in the TM4C123GXL microcontroller’s ADC input terminals [34], there 
are two diodes which are present to shunt high positive as well as negative voltages to ground 
and positive power supply terminals, respectively. In an ideal scenario, in which both these 
diodes have identical current versus voltage characteristics, this ESD protection circuit will 
not provide rectification on AC signals. But, in a real circuit, there will always be mismatch 
in the current versus voltage characteristics of these two diodes, resulting in a difference in 
the level of AC signal shunted to the positive of negative terminals, which would indeed 
produce a non-zero DC component.  
 
Figure 2-1 ESD protection circuits rectifying injected IEMI AC signal into DC 
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Figure 2-2 Experiment to validate rectification hypothesis due to ESD diodes 
To validate this hypothesis, TM4C123GXL microcontroller from Texas Instruments, 
which has ADC functionality, were used. The ADC input terminal was connected to an AC 
signal generator, with 10 dBm (10 mW) output power level, along with a multimeter. The 
multimeter was set to measure DC voltages. This experimental setup is shown by Figure 2-2. 
While the microcontroller circuit was not connected to the multimeter and AC signal 
generators, the multimeter reads 0 V DC as expected, since the AC signal from the signal 
generator does not have any DC components. But as soon as the microcontroller was 
powered on and connected to the multimeter and AC signal generator, the multimeter reads a 
positive DC voltage. Figure 2-3 shows that the conversion of AC signal into DC is most 
efficient under 500 MHz frequency, beyond which there is a steep drop in the magnitude of 
DC voltage produces. The results from Figure 2-3 validate the hypothesis that the AC signal 
could get rectified into DC signal thereby having the capability to inject false data into 
ADC’s input terminal. 
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Figure 2-3 Rectified DC voltage measured at the input of ADC, while directly connecting an 
AC signal to the input terminal 
Other type of non-linearity present in the ADC arises due to signal clipping. Signal 
clipping happens because of the limited voltage range which can be digitized by the ADC. In 
the case of ADC present in the TM4C123GXL microcontroller, voltage ranges between 0 V 
and 3.3 V can be digitized without any error due to signal clipping. Thus, any input voltage 
signal above 3.3 V, will be read as 3.3 V by the ADC and voltages below 0 V, will be 
rounded to 0 V in the digitization process. Figure 2-4 shows the relation between ADC input 
voltage and the equivalent voltage to the ADC digital output. From Figure 2-4, one can 
understand the case when an attack AC signal (1 Vpeak) superimposed on a positive DC 
voltage (+3.3 V) would experience signal clipping, resulting in the positive cycle of the AC 
signal assigned digital codes equivalent to 3.3 V. The negative cycle of the AC signal would 
be unaffected, assuming that the ADC can sample at a faster rate than the AC signal’s 
Nyquist frequency. Thus, the digitized signal at the output of the ADC would have a DC 
voltage of 2.67 V (3.3 V – 0.63 x 1 Vpeak), which is less than the intended DC input voltage 
19 
 
of 3.3 V. The multiplication factor 0.63 in the above calculation, comes from sinusoidal 
signal averaged over half of its period. 
 
Figure 2-4 Signal clipping due to limited ADC input voltage range 
2.2 Experimental Setup 
Figure 2-5 shows a system level representation of the experimental setup used for 
injecting false data on analog sensor. The following sections describe in detail about each 
part of the experimental setup. 
2.2.1 Victim Circuit 
As mentioned earlier, the victim circuit or the circuit under IEMI attack consist of an 
SFH235 IR optical sensor from OSRAM Opto Semiconductors [35], connected to a Tiva 
C TM4C123GXL microcontroller from Texas Instruments [34], containing an ADC, with 
12-bit resolution. The microcontroller communicates with a personal computer (PC) 
through serial communication.  
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Figure 2-5 Experimental setup for false data injection on analog sensors 
The IR sensor was reverse biased with a 5V DC signal from a DC power source, 
while the IR sensor was connected to a 330kΩ resistor, to convert the current signal 
generated from the IR sensor into voltage signal that can be read by an ADC. To control 
the output of the IR sensor, an IR lamp with an output power rating of 5 W at 850 nm 
wavelength was positioned towards the sensor. Figure 2-6 shows the schematic 
representation of the victim circuit. 
The ADC present in the TM4C123GXL microcontroller was programmed to sample 
the input signal at a rate of 1 mega samples per second (MSPS). The sampled/digitized 
outputs of the ADC are averaged over 1000 samples to filter out high frequency noise 
and the averaged values are sent to the computer’s serial terminal. 
IR 
Lamp
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Figure 2-6 Schematic representation of victim circuit 
 
2.2.2 Attacker Circuit 
As shown by Figure 2-5, the attacker circuit consist of a signal generator, power amplifier 
and an antenna to transmit the attack signal. Since it is difficult to analytically determine the 
resonant frequency of the victim circuit, due to complex traces and lack of publicly available 
high frequency models for the microcontroller, the attacker circuit should be able to sweep 
the signal frequency across a wideband and determine the frequency at which maximum 
power transfer happens.  
HP8350B signal generator from Hewlett Packard, which has the capability to sweep the 
signal frequency from 10 MHz to 20 GHz was chosen for this experiment. This signal 
generator produces a narrow band sinusoidal signal with a maximum output power of 20 
dBm (100 mW). Since the output power from the signal generator might not be enough to 
perform an IEMI attack over longer distances between the attacker and victim circuits, a 
power amplifier was used to boost the transmitted signal’s power. 
ZHL-1A RF power amplifier from Mini Circuits was used to amplify the transmitted 
signal. This power amplifier can operate between the frequency range 2 MHz – 500 MHz, 
without suffering any non-linearities. The 1 dB compression point of this power amplifier is 
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28 dBm, which specifies the maximum output power at which the power amplifier begins to 
experience non-linearities and as a result produces 1 dB less output power than the expected 
power output due to nominal gain.  
It was experimentally observed that the ZHL-1A RF power amplifier can give an 
output power of 32.6 dBm (1.82 W) with an input power level of 20 dBm from the signal 
generator. This output level was consistent between the frequencies from 2 MHz to 500 
MHz, beyond which there was a sharp decrease in the output power level. Figure 2-7 shows 
the output power vs frequency characteristics of ZHL-1A RF power amplifier. This RF 
power amplifier used in the attack circuit, was biased with +24 V DC voltage from HP-
E3631A DC power supply. 
 
Figure 2-7 Power Amplifier output vs frequency 
 For the attack circuit to be efficient at coupling EM wave on the victim circuit, 
directional antenna is necessary. Unlike an omni-directional antenna, which emits radiation 
in all direction in a single plane, directional antenna tends to have narrow radiation pattern, 
thus less energy would be wasted in unwanted directions, compared to the energy 
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successfully coupled to the victim circuit. But, unlike the far-field radiation pattern of many 
directive antennae, under near-field it is difficult to achieve radiation in a confined direction. 
Although there are were attempts from P. Rastogi et. al. to create a near-field radiator with 
focused field [36], these solutions exists for transmitting signals in the kHz range, under 
which the impedance matching issues are far less prominent. 
Along with focused radiation characteristics, the antenna used for IEMI attack should 
have wide bandwidth of operation. This is because of the difficulty in pre-determining the 
resonant frequency of the victim circuit, due to the complex interconnections and lack of 
publicly available high frequency models. Thus, having an antenna with wide band 
operational capability would help the attacker sweep the transmitted signal frequency across 
a wide range and determine the frequency at which IEMI attack takes place efficiently.  
 Vivaldi antenna was chosen to be used at the attack circuit as a transmitter, due to its 
wide band operational range. This antenna falls under the class of traveling wave antennae 
[37].  The chosen Vivaldi antenna has an antipodal dual exponential tapered slot antenna 
(DETSA), exponential lines running on both edges of the antenna. Since the antenna is 
antipodal, each branch of the antenna is placed on one side of the PCB, which makes input 
impedance match easier as compared to traditional Vivaldi antenna design [38]. This antenna 
was fabricated on a FR4 board with 1.5 mm substrate thickness and 35 um copper thickness. 
The designed antenna measured 35 cm x 30 cm in size. The antenna was designed and 
optimized using ANSYS HFSS software tool, which is being shown by Figure 2-8. 
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Figure 2-8 Vivaldi antenna designed in ANSYS HFSS 
 Return loss or S11 (scattering parameter or S-parameter) is used to quantify the 
amount of power successfully transferred to a load, as an antenna, from its source, compared 
against the amount of power reflected from the load to the source. This parameter is useful to 
characterize high frequency components such as an antenna. For an antenna usually S11 
below -8 dB is considered acceptable, which represents the condition at which ~60% of the 
power generated at the source is successfully transferred to the load. Figure 2-9 compares the 
return loss or S11 of the Vivaldi antenna to monopole antenna. As expected, the Vivaldi 
antenna has an S11 less than -8 dB from 350 MHz to 2 GHz, while the monopole antenna has 
a narrow bandwidth of operation around 700 MHz. 
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Figure 2-9 Return loss of Vivaldi antenna compared against a monopole antenna 
 Figure 2-10 shows the 3D plot showing the electric field radiation pattern of Vivaldi 
antenna, operating at 250 MHz. The color ‘red’ in this figure indicates the region in which 
maximum radiation energy is present, while light blue color indicates regions with least 
amount of radiation. This figure shows that the radiation pattern of a Vivaldi antenna, is not 
an improvement over a dipole antenna. But, the wideband frequency characteristics of this 
antenna, makes it a suitable candidate for IEMI attack experiments, in which the resonant 
frequency of the victim circuit is unknown. 
Figure 2-12 shows the x, y, z components of the magnetic and electric field plots 
along the Y axis. The position of x, y and z, with respect to the antenna, can be seen from 
Figure 2-11. These plots represent the variation in the intensity of individual E-field and H-
field components, as the distance increases in the end-fire direction. From this figure, it can 
be understood that the strongest component of E-field exists in the x direction, while the H-
field’s strongest component exist in the z direction. But, the magnitude of E-field is ~445 
times greater than the magnitude of H-field. Hence the induced signal at the victim circuit 
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could have strong correlation with the electric field component existing along the x direction, 
while using this Vivaldi antenna to transmit the attack signal. 
 
Figure 2-10 Electric field pattern of Vivaldi antenna under near-field conditions 
 
Figure 2-11 Vivaldi antenna shown with corresponding axes 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2-12 a) Magnetic field and b) Electric field plots of Vivaldi antenna along the end-fire 
direction 
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2.2.3 Anechoic chamber 
As mentioned earlier, IEMI attack relies on near-field power transfer. Near-field of an 
antenna is defined as the region in which the rate of decay of electric field and magnetic field 
are not inversely proportional to the distance from the antenna, but inversely related to the 
square or cube of the distance from the antenna, depending on the type of antenna. This 
effect has been shown in the field plots in Figure 2-12. For a large antenna, where the 
dimensions of the antenna are larger than half the wavelength of the signal being transmitted, 
the near field region can be described by equation (2-1) [39]. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
2𝐷2
𝜆
 (2-1) 
In this equation, parameter ‘D’ represents the largest dimension of the antenna, while ‘λ’ 
represents the wavelength of the signal being transmitted. Any electric or magnetic 
conductors present within this near-field region, would interact with the antenna and would 
result in a change in the antenna’s impedance characteristics. 
For the Vivaldi antenna, the largest dimension was 35 cm and if we consider the lowest 
operational frequency of 350 MHz, which has a λ of ~85.6 cm, the near-field region around 
the antenna would be ~29 cm. Thus, any conductive elements present within 29 cm of the 
antenna, would result in a change in the antenna input impedance, there by changing the 
amount of signal power radiated from the antenna. 
Along with near-field clearance around the antenna, the experimental setup could suffer 
from additional errors introduced by the transmitted signal bouncing from nearby objects 
such as wall, metallic objects, etc. This could be increasing or decreasing the amount of 
power coupled to the victim circuit. To avoid these interferences from the experimental 
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setup, the author chose to surround the experimental area with Radiation Absorbing Material 
(RAM), as shown by Figure 2-13.  
 
Figure 2-13 Experimental setup with Radiation Absorbing Material (RAM) shields 
 A chamber full of RAMs were traditionally used to absorb sound or electromagnetic 
wave from reflecting off the walls of the chamber. Such a chamber was called anechoic 
chamber. Anechoic chambers are essential in scenarios such as characterizing antenna or 
sound recording, where reflection of waves (electromagnetic or sound) from the walls of a 
chamber would introduce sources of noise. 
 For IEMI attack, the victim circuit was enclosed by RAMs rather than a full anechoic 
chamber, due to certain requirement of the victim circuit. The most important requirement of 
the victim circuit being the usage of short USB cables to communicate with the PC, which 
would avoid interference of the IEMI attack signal from disrupting the serial communication 
between the PC and the microcontroller. Since longer USB cables would be essential to 
connect the victim circuit to a PC, while placing it inside an anechoic chamber, the serial 
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communication could become susceptible to interference from EM signal, due to the long 
USB cable acting as an antenna. 
 Thus, the IEMI experiment was conducted by surrounding the victim circuit on four 
out of five sides of a cuboid. The top side of the cuboid was left open, since the antenna used 
for transmitting the IEMI attack signal was end-fire type, meaning the radiation emitted from 
the antenna travels in the direction of the Y axis (as shown in Figure 2-11). The front side of 
the cuboid was not covered with RAM, to have space for the large Vivaldi antenna to be 
positioned. This setup eliminates the need for using longer USB cables, since the 
experimental setup with RAM walls could be easily place close to a PC, without any issues. 
 This partial anechoic chamber with RAMs ensures that, the radiation emitted from the 
Vivaldi antenna does not get reflected from the walls of the cuboid, while the IEMI attack 
signal transmitter, namely Vivaldi antenna, does not experience impedance interference from 
sources, other than the disturbance coming from the intended victim circuit. 
 Figure 2-13 shows the victim circuit placed on a non-conductive cardboard surface, 
hung from a non-conductive wooden rod, using cotton threads. Placing the victim circuit 
directly on top of the RAMs might attenuate the IEMI attack signal trying to get coupled to 
the victim circuit. Hence, a decision was made to position the victim circuit in the middle of 
the partial anechoic chamber. 
2.3 Experimental Results 
The IEMI attack to inject false data into photo-diode sensor circuit, was performed with 
different ambient IR light conditions, to better understand the effects of this attack on a real-
world scenario. Thus, three different IR ambient light conditions were chosen, namely, no 
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light, medium light and maximum light conditions. The different ambient light conditions 
were controlled with the help of an IR lamp capable of outputting 5W radiation at 850 nm 
wavelength.  
Since the IR lamp used in this experiment came with metallic casing, this lamp was 
placed between the cones of the RAMs, which were shown in Figure 2-13. The author 
believes that, this setup would avoid any impedance interference or EM reflection from the 
IR lamp casing. 
As the term ‘no light’ suggests, this lighting condition represents the experimental 
condition when no explicit IR radiation source was present near the experimental setup. 
Since the ADC present in the TM4C123GXL microcontroller can digitize voltages between 0 
V and 3.3 V, the ambient IR light conditions when the ADC reads 1.5 V, which is close to 
the half of the maximum voltage value that the ADC can read, was assigned as medium light 
condition. The maximum light experimental condition uses sufficient IR radiation from the 
IR lamp to produce a DC voltage just below 3.3 V, by 1 mV to 20 mV. The reason for setting 
the DC voltage for maximum light condition to be carefully set just below 3.3 V was due to 
the maximum DC voltage that the ADC can read. As mentioned previously, any voltage 
above 3.3 V would be read as 3.3 V by the ADC. Hence, it was important to set the sensor 
output voltage to couple of millivolts less than 3.3 V, to fully observe the effect of the 
coupled attack signal, without introducing any error due to signal clipping.  
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The 1 mV to 20 mV variation in the maximum light condition exists due to the difficulty 
in precisely controlling the IR lamp output power, which was done by controlling the voltage 
supply to the lamp, using an external DC power supply, as well as changing the orientation of 
the IR lamp. 
 
Figure 2-14 ADC output when the distance of separation between the transmitter and victim 
circuit was 10 cm, under (a) No IR light condition. (b) Medium IR light condition. (c) 
Maximum IR light condition. 
Figure 2-14 (a), (b) and (c) shows the experimental results under the three different IR 
lighting conditions, along with results from three different trials. For all the trails presented in 
these plots, the distance between the IEMI attack signal transmitting Vivaldi antenna and the 
edge of the microcontroller/ photo-diode circuit was fixed at 10 cm. The term ‘nominal 
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(Vact)’ represents the DC voltage that the ADC would read under the condition when no 
IEMI attack signal was present. Thus for Figure 2-14 (a) the value of Vact is 0 V, while the 
values of Vact in Figure 2-14 (b) and Figure 2-14 (c) are 1.5 V and 3.3 V. The frequency 
dependent data for Figure 2-14 was obtained by changing the transmitted EM signal 
frequency by a step size of 10 MHz from 1 MHz to 1 GHz. 
Figure 2-14 (a) conforms with the rectification and signal clipping hypothesis presented 
in the ‘mechanism of attack’ section. Thus, a maximum of ~1 V DC false data was 
introduced into the victim circuit at 290 MHz, which could be the resonant frequency of the 
victim circuit. Under no light condition, the effect of rectification could be dominant over 
signal clipping phenomenon, since the induced DC voltage were measured externally using a 
digital multi-meter from Fluke, which does not suffer from the signal clipping non-linearity 
due to the extended voltage range from -1000 V DC to + 1000 V DC [40]. Figure 2-15 shows 
the signal measured at the input terminal of ADC, using an oscilloscope. As seen from this 
figure, there is a clear DC offset of ~1.28 V, under no IR radiation condition. Like the digital 
multimeter, the oscilloscope has a much wider voltage measurement range and hence, proves 
that the DC offset induced at the victim circuit does not occur as a result of signal clipping. It 
is also important to note that under the no light condition, the photo-diode behaves like a 
capacitor, since it does not conduct current due to absence of ambient IR radiation. This 
capacitive behavior comes from the reverse biased P-N junction inside the photo-diode [35].  
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Figure 2-15 Oscilloscope screenshot showing the DC offset induced at the input terminal of 
ADC, under no IR light condition 
Figure 2-14 (c) shows a drop in ADC voltage, rather than an increase, as with the no light 
condition. This is because, the DC voltage generated from the photo-diode sensor and the DC 
voltage generated from the rectification of coupled EM signal, acts as if the two DC voltage 
sources were in parallel, thereby their DC currents subtract from each other, thus resulting in 
a net voltage, which was the difference between the two DC voltages. This phenomenon is 
clear, while comparing the Figure 2-14 (a) and (c), because, Figure 2-14 (c) can be obtained 
by subtracting the data in Figure 2-14 (a) from 3.3 V. Also, the results shown in Figure 2-16 
suggests that there was an DC offset induced at the input terminal of ADC and is not due to 
the signal clipping phenomenon occurring during the digitization process. 
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Figure 2-16 Oscilloscope image showing DC offset induced at the victim circuit, under 
maximum IR light condition 
Under the maximum IR light condition, the photo-diode is behaving as a short circuit for 
AC signal, rather than a capacitor, due to the DC current flow through its P-N junction, when 
the photo-diode was exposed to IR light. Thus, net false data injection of ~1 V was injected 
at 290 MHz. 
The results presented in Figure 2-14 (b) follows similar explanation as with the Figure 
2-14 (c) results. Since the photo-diode was exposed to IR light, under medium IR light 
condition, the P-N junction inside the photo-diode was conductive and which produced a DC 
voltage source in parallel with the DC voltage source provided by the coupled EM signal 
rectification. The net results in Figure 2-14 (b) could be obtained by first scaling the data in 
Figure 2-14 (a) by 0.2 and then subtracting the results from 1.5 V. Thus, a maximum of -0.2 
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V DC was injected as false data into the ADC, under medium light condition. The reason for 
the decrease in the induced DC voltage at the victim circuit, could be thought of as an effect 
of change in impedance of the victim circuit, due to the quasi-open nature of the photo-diode, 
thus resulting in a reduction in the amplitude of the AC signal induced. But the oscilloscope 
measurement of the coupled signal amplitude, present at the input of the ADC terminal, 
shown by Figure 2-17, suggests otherwise. Hence, the best hypothesis for the reduction in the 
amplitude of induced DC signal could be attributed to the change in AC to DC conversion 
efficiency, caused by the ESD diodes, under different DC biasing conditions.  
 
Figure 2-17 Oscilloscope image showing same amplitude of induced sinusoidal signal, under 
medium IR light condition 
Figure 2-14 (b) shows the data slightly above 1.5 V nominal value, at frequencies below 
200 MHz and above 600 MHz. This was due to the difficulty in controlling the photo-diode’s 
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exposure with IR light. The IR light exposure was controlled by positioning the IR lamp, so 
that the region of maximum IR radiation was angled away from the photo-diode sensor. But 
due to the difficulty with the IR lamp mounting system, there were few errors introduced 
between different trials and thus, a maximum of 50 mV deviation occurs from the nominal 
value of 1.5 V. 
It is important to note here that, the observations made from the experiment shows that, 
the rectified DC current flows in an opposing direction to the DC current generated from the 
photo-diode sensor, when the photo-diode is exposed to IR light. Hence, to increase the 
induction of negative DC voltage, the attacker must transmit more power towards the victim 
circuit.  
Although, it may seem that an IEMI attacker could only induce a negative DC voltage 
into the ADC input, while the photo-diode sensor is exposed to IR radiation, while positive 
DC voltage induction is only possible under the conditions when no IR light presence in the 
environment, it is possible to induce positive DC voltage into the victim circuit using certain 
wideband waveforms. The details regarding these waveforms will be discussed in the 
chapters 3 and 4. 
Figure 2-18 shows the results of induced ADC voltage with respect to frequency, while 
the distance between the attacker antenna and the victim circuit were varied from 10 cm to 
100 cm. The data shown in Figure 2-18 were obtained under no IR light conditions, as with 
the Figure 2-14 (a). One can notice a slight variation between the data shown in Figure 2-14 
(a) and the data corresponding to 10 cm distance between attacker and victim circuit in 
Figure 2-18. This variation was due to the use of 5 MHz frequency step size as opposed to 
the 10 MHz step size used in Figure 2-14. Also, the experimental setup was slightly modified 
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by opening the vertical side wall RAMs outwards away from the victim circuit, to facilitate 
the attack signal to better couple with the victim circuit and avoid being attenuated by the 
RAMs. This modification to the experimental setup was essential, since under distances 
beyond 50 cm between the attacker and the victim circuit, the induced DC voltages were 
significantly low due to EM signal attenuation by the RAM. Because of these experimental 
setup changes, the 10 cm data in Figure 2-18 has slight variation from Figure 2-14 (a). 
 
Figure 2-18 ADC voltage induced under no IR light condition, with varying distance between 
the EM signal transmitting antenna and the victim circuit 
The following section discusses building a theoretical model for the attacker and victim 
circuits and using this model to get an estimate on the required amount of power from an 
attacker’s perspective, to induce a certain amount of false DC voltage into the photo-diode 
sensor circuit. 
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2.4 Transmitted power requirement estimation 
An attacker using the IEMI technique to inject false data into an analog sensor would be 
interested in knowing the minimum amount of power that must be transmitted to achieve a 
certain level of DC voltage induction at the victim circuit’s ADC input, while accounting for 
the distance of separation between the attacker and the victim circuits. Since the IEMI attack 
relies on the parasitic properties of the victim circuit to couple the attack signal, it is difficult 
to obtain a closed form analytical solution with an accurate model of the attacker as well as 
the victim circuits. This problem of modelling the circuits is exacerbated by the complex 
interconnection and PCB traces in the victim circuit. Hence the author chose to simplify the 
models of attacker and victim circuits, operating under near-field conditions, to get an 
intuitive understanding of the EM coupling mechanism. Thus, the power requirement can be 
estimated by modelling both the victim and the attacker circuits as an Resistor-Inductor-
Capacitor (RLC) circuit and approximating the antenna which transmits IEMI signal at the 
attacker side and the section of the victim circuit responsible for receiving this IEMI signal as 
loop antennae.  
 
Figure 2-19 Equivalent circuit model for the IEMI attacker and the victim circuit 
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 Figure 2-19 shows the simplified equivalent circuits of the attacker and the victim 
circuits. The part of the attacker circuit which is essential for getting a closed form solution, 
is the antenna. The transmitting antenna, which has been connected to the signal source 
‘RFsource’, is modelled as a loop antenna with radius ‘r1’, while the parameter ‘Rs’ 
represents the source resistance. On the victim circuit side, the parameters ‘Remb’ load 
resistances, which the coupled EM signal experiences, while the parasitic components which 
were responsible for coupling the attack EM signal on to the victim circuit was modelled as a 
loop antenna with radius ‘r2’. The two loop antennae were separated by a distance ‘b’, with 
an assumption that ‘b’ is within the near-field regions of the two antennae. 
Figure 2-19 needs to be further simplified by reducing the loop antennae into its 
corresponding inductance, capacitance and resistances, before a closed form solution, for the 
required transmitted power, can be attempted. 
 
Figure 2-20 Simplified equivalent circuit models for the attacker and victim circuits 
  
 Figure 2-20 shows the simplified circuit model of the attacker and victim circuits. The 
RF signal source has been represented by the terms ‘A sinωt’, which represents the signal 
source outputting a sinusoidal signal with amplitude ‘A’ and frequency ‘ω’, while ‘t’ 
represents time. The parameter ‘Rt’ represents the source resistance as well as the ohmic 
losses at the attacker side, while ‘C1’ and ‘L1’ represents the parasitic capacitances and 
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inductances of the attacker circuit, respectively. Similarly, ‘RL’, ‘C2’ and ‘L2’ represents the 
load resistance, parasitic capacitances and inductances of the victim circuit, respectively. The 
parameters ‘i1’ and ‘i2’ with arrows represents the AC current magnitude with direction of 
current flow. The parameter ‘M’ represents the mutual inductance between the two inductors 
‘L1’ and ‘L2’, which is directly proportional to the distance between transmitting and 
receiving loop antennae. Using the loop antenna description provided in the Figure 2-19, one 
can estimate the value of ‘M’ using the equation (2-2) [41]. 
 𝑀 =  
𝜇0𝜋 𝑟1
2𝑟2
2
2 (√𝑏2 + 𝑟1
2)
3 , 𝑟1 > 𝑟2 (2-2) 
In equation (2-2), 𝜇0 represents the permeability of air. The assumption that the 
radius of the transmitting loo antenna is larger than the victim loop antenna is usually true, 
since the physical size of PCB traces responsible for coupling the attack EM signal, is very 
small, when compared to dimensions of the attacker’s antenna. 
If the attacking circuit is operating at the same frequency as the resonant frequency 
(𝜔0) of the victim circuit, the impedance provided by the capacitance and inductance in each 
loop will get cancelled out. Hence, the only reactance in these circuits would be provided by 
the mutual inductances. Using Kirchhoff's voltage law for the attacker and victim circuit 
models, the following equations were obtained, 
 −𝐴 + 𝑖1𝑅𝑡 − 𝑗𝜔0𝑀 𝐴 𝑖2 = 0 (2-3) 
 −𝑗𝜔0𝑀𝑖1 + 𝑖2𝑅𝐿 = 0 (2-4) 
Solving equations (2-3) and (2-4) to evaluate i2, 
 𝑖2 =  
𝑗𝜔0𝑀 𝐴
𝑅𝑡𝑅𝐿 +  𝜔0
2𝑀2
 (2-5) 
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Using the value of i2, the expression for the power coupled at the victim circuit can be found 
as, 
 𝑃𝐿 =  
1
2
 𝑖2
2 𝑅𝐿 (2-6) 
In equation (2-6) the term ‘PL’ represents the power coupled at the victim circuit. 
Substituting equation (2-5) in (2-6), 
 𝑃𝐿 =  
1
2
−𝜔0
2 𝑀2𝐴2
(𝑅𝑡𝑅𝐿 +  𝜔0
2𝑀2)2
 𝑅𝐿 (2-7) 
 Using the expression for transmitted power ‘𝑃𝑡’, given by the following equation, 
 𝑃𝑡 =
𝐴2
8𝑅𝑠
 (2-8) 
the power coupled at the victim circuit can be estimated as, 
 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑃𝑡 (
2𝜔0𝑀
𝑅𝑡𝑅𝐿 +  𝜔0
2𝑀2
)
2
𝑅𝑠 𝑅𝐿 (2-9) 
Using the equation (2-9), one can compute the exact DC voltage induced at the input of ADC 
using the following equation, 
 𝑉𝑎𝑑𝑐 =  √2𝑃𝐿𝑅𝐿 (2-10) 
Equation (2-10) was obtained with ideal rectifying diodes (ESD) assumption, in which the 
diodes don’t introduce any voltage loss, during the rectification process. 
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Figure 2-21 Comparison between theoretical and measured induced ADC voltage with 
varying distance between attacker and victim circuits 
 
Figure 2-21 compares the induced voltage magnitude measured at the input of ADC 
versus the theoretical values obtained using equation (2-10). Since the circuit components 
shown in Figure 2-20 is an over-simplified version of the transmitter and victim circuits, the 
value of these components was selected using trial and error method, until a close fit between 
the theoretical and measured data were obtained. Thus, the values of ‘r1’ and ‘r2’ in equation 
(2-2) were chosen as 15 cm and 1.4 cm, while the resonant frequency ‘𝜔0’ was chosen as 
250 MHz, which was approximately close the frequencies at which maximum value of DC 
false data were injected at the victim circuit. The value of ‘Rt’ was set to 50 Ω, since the 
transmitting antenna was matched to 50 Ω, and the ohmic losses in the transmitter are 
negligible compared to this characteristic impedance. The value of ‘RL’ was set to 250 Ω, 
which was obtained using the datasheet of the TM4C123GXL microcontroller [34]. 
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 The measured data presented in Figure 2-21 were obtained by selecting the maximum 
induced DC voltage and neglects selecting the data from 250 MHz, as with the theoretical 
data. This method of data selection from the measured dataset was acceptable, since there 
were slight variations in the resonant frequency as the distance between the attacker and 
victim circuits were increased, due to the experimental setup changes involving re-
positioning of the RAM side walls. This re-positioning of RAM side walls could have let the 
transmitting antenna impedance get affected by conductive objects present around the 
experimental area and might have contributed to the variation in resonant frequency. Thus, a 
maximum deviation of 20 MHz around the 250 MHz resonant frequency was considered 
acceptable to account for the change in the transmitting antenna impedance change. 
  Figure 2-21 shows close match between the theoretical and measured data, validating 
the simplified circuit model for attacker and victim circuits. Thus, as an IEMI attacker, one 
can use equations (2-2), (2-9) and (2-10) to compute the minimum required EM power to be 
transmitted to induce a particular amount of DC false data into the analog sensor circuit. 
 The experimental results shown in this chapter proves that besides inducing AC 
signal into victim circuits, as shown by Kune et. al [30], IEMI attack can induce DC signals, 
which tremendously expands the scope of this attack technique to all the analog sensors, 
which generate an DC voltage or current signal as a response to a physical change in the 
environment. 
 Since most analog sensors operate at voltage ranges in the order of hundreds of 
millivolts, the IEMI attack technique becomes a viable option for an attacker, even at 
distances in the order of meters, with transmitted power requirements in the order of few 
watts. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, analog sensors connected to embedded systems, were considered as target 
for an IEMI attack technique. It has been shown that a photo-diode based analog sensor 
circuit, was able to be deterministically injected with false data, using IEMI attack technique. 
Using ~1.8 W continuous sinusoidal signal transmission, the photo-diode circuit, which was 
a representation of analog sensor circuits, regardless of the type, could induce ~1.2 V DC, 
when the analog sensor was outputting 0 V or 3.3 V DC. Under the conditions, when the 
analog sensor was generating 1.5 V DC signal, a maximum of ~250 mV DC false data was 
injected into this sensor circuit output. Theoretical analysis on the power requirement for an 
attacker, to deterministically induce a certain value of false data, has also been discussed. 
Thus, this chapter proves that IEMI attack technique poses a greater risk for a wide range of 
embedded systems, which rely on analog sensors, to gather information about its 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FALSE DATA INJECTION FOR DIGITAL SENSORS 
 
This section has used materials that were published in the paper “Electromagnetic 
Induction Attack on Embedded Systems”, by J. Selvaraj et. al, with the permission of all the 
authors [31]. 
Digital sensors are a class of sensors which have data converters inbuilt, and thus outputs 
the data in a digital format. Compared to analog sensors, digital sensors are robust due to its 
tendency to resist noise in the data transmission path, which is a major problem for analog 
sensors. These advantages over analog counterparts have made digital sensors a predominant 
choice, while considering sensors in an application. Digital sensors communicate their output 
data serially to an embedded system. 
General Purpose Input/ Output (GPIO) are a set of digital input/output pins available on 
an integrated circuit, which were not assigned a predefined function. In an embedded system, 
these GPIO pins provide the freedom for the user to define them as either digital inputs or 
outputs, which make them as suitable candidate to connect digital sensors, to send and 
receive data. 
 Digital sensors can communicate with embedded systems serially using pulse width 
modulation or serial data at a particular bit rate. There is a myriad of digital sensors available 
in the market currently, including, but not limited to, sensors to measure temperature, 
pressure, light, orientation/position, proximity, sound, speed and acceleration. These sensors 
are an integral part of an embedded system, allowing it to estimate a physical quantity and 
process the data digitally.  
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Navigation systems in modern smart phones, for examples, uses many sensors to 
determine the precise location of the user and provide them with turn-by-turn navigation. 
Some of the sensors used by our phone’s navigation systems are Global Position System 
(GPS), accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer sensors. The gyroscope sensor is an 
example of fully digital sensor, with data sampling and data conversion systems built inside 
the chip [42]. 
Increased reliance on these automated navigation systems has led to several people 
losing their lives, the phenomenon of which has been named as death-by-GPS. In 2011, a 
couple lost their lives by, when they were on their way to Las Vegas. This was due to their 
reliance on GPS navigation system in their van, which led them into a road in the middle of 
nowhere, in the northeastern Nevada [43]. It was sad to notice that this was not an isolated 
case. Even with the advancements in navigation technologies, people’s unquestioned faith on 
their smart phones have costed their lives. Hence, along with solving existing problems with 
modern navigation systems, researchers must investigate potential danger of false data 
injection into these digital sensors, which could pose for future consumers. Especially the 
non-invasive false data injection technique into digital sensors, using IEMI attack, described 
in this chapter, needs to be investigated thoroughly, to understand the risks it could bring to 
general public, who are already plagued with dangers such as death-by-GPS. 
 Digital sensors are generally thought to be at lower risk from IEMI attacks. The 
reason for digital sensor’s resilience for noise was due to the high amplitude logic levels as 
compared to the continuously varying voltage/current signals outputted by analog sensors. 
Also, this makes the digital sensors a difficult target for false data injection attacks, due to the 
need for identification of specific bit’s logic level to induce a bit flip. Along with these 
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challenges, an IEMI attack would require relatively large power requirement for an attacker 
to induce sufficient voltage shifts, to cause the bits to flip. 
Despite these challenges, in this chapter, IEMI technique will be used to demonstrate 
false data injection into digital sensors which are connected to the GPIO pins of an embedded 
system and communicate serially. This attack was demonstrated by using two 
microcontrollers, with one being a transmitter, mimicking a digital sensor, while the other 
being a receiver, using the GPIO pin. 
3.1 IEMI attack using continuous sinusoidal signal 
Tiva C microcontroller boards from Texas Instruments was chosen for this 
experiment, due to the availability of GPIO pins on the circuit board [34]. Figure 3-1 shows 
the experimental setup used for demonstrating this attack technique. Like the setup used for 
attacking analog sensors, the experimental area was covered with RAMs to avoid signal 
reflection from the near-by objects (shown in Figure 3-2). As mentioned before, one 
microcontroller was assigned the task of transmitting digital bits, while the other receives this 
data. The receiving microcontroller was connected to a PC, through USB cables, to output 
the total number of 1s and 0s received. 
Continuous sinusoidal signal was decided as the attack signal, due to the results from 
chapter 2, which showed that an DC offset could be observed while coupling AC signal on to 
the input pins of microcontroller. The ideal condition for an attacker would be the induced 
AC signal, resulting due to the transmission of continuous sinusoidal signal, would offset the 
DC level at the input of the GPIO terminal, such that, the received digital signals would be 
modified, depending on the intention of the attacker. Thus, the victim circuit’s embedded 
system would read a logic level 0, even though the digital sensor sends out a digital bit ‘1’, 
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due to the DC offset introduced by the induced AC attack signal. To verify this hypothesis, 
an experimental setup was shown by Figure 2-5, justifying the induction of DC offsets. 
 The attacker circuit was exactly same as the one used for analog sensor attack, as 
shown in Figure 2-5. Furthermore, Vivaldi antenna was used to transmit the attacker’s signal, 
due to its broadband capability, which allows the attacker to sweep the frequency and 
identify the resonant frequency of the victim circuit, at which maximum power transfer takes 
place. To increase the EM signal coupling at the victim circuit, 15 cm long jumper cables 
were used to interconnect the transmitting and receiving microcontrollers. 
In the first method, constant logic level will be transmitted to the receiving 
microcontroller and the total number of 1s and 0s received will be counted and sent to a PC 
to demonstrate that an IEMI attack can induce voltage change at the victim circuit, which is 
significant enough to cause bit flips. By using constant logic level transmission, the 
effectiveness of IEMI attack signal in causing a logic change can be estimated. Thus, if 
digital logic 1 was transmitted, then the data sent to the PC will indicate, the number of times 
logic level 1 was misread as logic level 0 by the receiving microcontroller. The receiving 
microcontroller was programmed to sample at a rate of 167 kbps, hence the logic level of the 
signal transmitted was sampled every 6 μs, with the microcontroller operating at 16 MHz 
clock speed. 
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Figure 3-1 Experimental setup for demonstrating IEMI attack on digital sensors 
The microcontroller was programmed to sample 10,000 data points and identify the total 
number of digital 1s and 0s. Thus, two different test cases were used, namely, transmitting 
constant 0 digital logic and transmitting constant 1 digital logic. In each of the cases, the 
IEMI attack signal will result in some percentage of fault injection at the receiving 
microcontroller, leading to 0s being misread as 1s and 1s being misread as 0s. 
Figure 3-2 shows the photograph of the actual experimental setup used for this attack, 
with the RAMs covering the four sides of the experiment area, similar to the setup used for 
attacking analog sensors. Both the antenna and the victim circuits were placed on a non-
conductive cardboard box, to provide elevation, away from the bottom RAM sheet, to 
prevent attenuation of signal directed towards the victim circuit.  
The distance between the microcontrollers and the attacker’s antenna was kept as close as 
possible, to increase the chance of bit misreads, due to the limited transmission power 
available at the lab facility, where this experiment was conducted. Similar to the 
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experimental setup used for analog sensor attack, ~1.8 W sinusoidal signal was supplied to 
the Vivaldi antenna’s input terminal, which would be transmitted towards the victim circuit. 
 
Figure 3-2 Photograph of experimental setup used to demonstrate IEMI attack on digital 
sensors 
3.1.1 Experimental results and discussion 
Figure 3-3 a and Figure 3-3 b shows the percentage of misreads at the receiving 
microcontroller, when the transmitting microcontroller was outputting logic level 1 and logic 
level 0, respectively. These figures show the aggregation of results from four different trials. 
The results from Figure 3-3 shows that significant misreads happened from 180 MHz to 220 
MHz, for both the cases involving transmission of digital 1 and 0. 
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Figure 3-3 Percentage of misreads vs frequency when the transmitting microcontroller sends 
a) logic level 0, b) logic level 1 
As shown by Figure 3-3, the maximum percentage of misreads, while transmitting logic 
level 0s and 1s, was ~38% and 30%, respectively. Although these misread percentage proves 
that the IEMI attack successfully injected false data into the victim circuit, it begs the 
question on why the attack was only able to result in less than 40% of misreads. This 
question could be answered by looking at the process of sampling a sinusoidal signal 
superimposed on a DC signal. 
Since the attack signal and the receiving microcontroller’s sampling clock signal are not 
synchronized, the sampling process at the receiving microcontroller can be thought of as an 
equivalent-time sampling [44]. Since the sinusoidal attack signal is superimposed on top of 
the digital logic signal, the data resulted from the sampling process would have a maximum 
of 50 % misreads of the logic level transmitted. This is because, a pure sinusoidal signal is 
symmetric and consist of equal portion of signal voltage above and below the average value 
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of 0 V. But this does not explain the difference between the misread percentage of logic 
levels 0s and 1s.  
 
Figure 3-4 Digital logic voltage level for 3.3 V systems 
The digital logic level used by the Tiva C microcontroller was 3.3 V. The logic voltage 
level of this microcontroller is shown in Figure 3-4, in which VIL and VIH represents the 
input level lower and higher voltage thresholds, respectively, while VOL and VOH 
represents the output level lower and higher voltage thresholds, respectively. Since the 
receiving microcontroller uses its input port, a total voltage shift of 2 V is needed to make the 
bit change from logic level 0 to 1, while a voltage drop of 2.5 V is required to achieve logic 
level 1 to 0-bit change. Since same amount of signal power was transmitted from the attacker 
circuit, the induced AC signal could achieve higher percentage of bit flips causing logic level 
0 to 1-bit change, resulting in an increased misread percentage, compared to 1 to 0-bit 
change. 
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3.2 Modified experimental setup demonstrating IEMI attack using continuous sinusoidal 
signal 
The results shown in Figure 3-3 does not align well with the theory of inducing DC offset 
due to the coupling of an AC signal, as inferred by the results obtained from analog sensor 
attacks. To understand the reasoning behind this irregularity, the author decided to modify 
the experimental setup as shown in Figure 3-5. This modified setup includes a longer 
interconnecting cable to carry the digital logic signal to the GPIO pins, along with the cable 
folded to form a coil with 3 turns, with an aim to increase the amplitude of the coupled signal 
onto the victim circuit, which would exaggerate the DC offsets induced by the coupled AC 
attack signal. This modification would eliminate the need for transmission of attack signal 
with higher power levels. The digital signal path was intercepted and connected to an 
oscilloscope to visualize the effect of signal coupled AC signal at the victim circuit.  
 
Figure 3-5 Modification to experimental setup to attack digital sensors, by using long 
interconnecting cable shaped as a coil 
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Since the interconnecting cable length was modified, it was experimentally found out that 
the maximum amplitude of signal coupling happened at 250 MHz. Hence, a continuous 
sinusoidal signal at 250 MHz frequency was transmitted from the Vivaldi antenna at 
maximum possible power level of 1.8W, to observe the effect on the logic levels.  
3.2.1 Experimental results and discussion 
Figure 3-6 shows the screenshot of the oscilloscope illustrating the DC levels present in 
the interconnecting cable, while the transmitting microcontroller sends logic level 1, when no 
attack signal was transmitted from the attacker circuit. From this figure, the DC voltage level 
available at the input terminal of the GPIO pin was ~ 2.1 V, which was enough to be 
registered as a logic level 1 at the receiving microcontroller, according to the data shown in 
Figure 3-4. This drop in voltage from the nominal voltage of 3.3 V, corresponding to the 
logic level 1, could be caused due to insufficient current supplied by the transmitting 
microcontroller. 
 
Figure 3-6 Oscilloscope image showing the DC voltage present at the interconnecting cable, 
while transmitting logic level 1 
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Figure 3-7 shows the signal present in the interconnecting cable, which was carrying 
the logic level 1, transmitted from a microcontroller. Since a sinusoidal signal with 4 Vp-p 
amplitude was coupled on to the victim circuit, the GPIO pin of the receiving microcontroller 
experiences a drop in average DC levels down to 317 mV, as shown by the measurement 
parameter ‘CycleMean’ at the bottom left corner of the oscilloscope image. 
 
Figure 3-7 Oscilloscope image showing a drop in the DC average voltage from 2.1 V, while 
transmitting a sinusoidal attack signal 
Due to this drop in DC levels, it was observed that a maximum of 64.7% misreads 
were achieved at the receiving microcontroller. This drop in the DC level agreed with the 
rectification effect observed during the IEMI attack on analog sensors, as described in 
chapter 2. The reason for not achieving 100% misread was due to the voltage peaks present 
in the sinusoidal signal, which were just above 2 V, that would be registered as digital logic 
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1, at the receiving microcontroller. The results shown by Figure 3-7 proves that, IEMI attack 
can induce a drop in DC levels, thus enabling a bit flip from logic level 1 to 0-bit. 
For the next experiment, the author tried to use the same attack technique of 
transmitting continuous sinusoidal signal, to induce a positive DC level change, while the 
transmitting microcontroller sends a digital logic level 0. 
 
Figure 3-8 Oscilloscope image showing the signal present in the interconnecting cable, while 
the transmitting microcontroller sends a logic level 0 
Figure 3-8 shows the signal present at the input of the GPIO pin, when the transmitting 
microcontroller sends a logic level 0. This figure shows that a positive DC offset of 288 mV 
was achieved at the input of GPIO pin, as shown by the measurement parameter 
‘CycleMean’, at the bottom left corner of the figure. Although the sinusoidal signal 
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amplitude of 2.72 V was induced onto the victim circuit, only 288 mV DC offset was 
achieved. This DC offset resulted in a slight improvement in the misread percentage, yielding 
40.3% misreads at the receiving microcontroller.  
This was contradicting the results obtained from analog sensor attack, which suggested 
that, it was possible to achieve 1.2 V positive DC offset, when the analog sensor was not 
outputting any DC current, under no IR radiation condition. The reason for the reduction in 
the DC offset was due to the logic level 0, which was being transmitted by the 
microcontroller. Unlike the no IR radiation condition, described in chapter 2, which provided 
a capacitive load to the input terminal of microcontroller, the transmitting microcontroller 
provides a low resistance path to ground, while transmitting logic level 0. This low resistance 
path to ground would have drained most of the DC current generated from the rectification 
process, provided by the ESD diodes, thus resulting in a decrease in the total DC offset 
achieved from this attack. 
 These results still prove the hypothesis that, it would be possible to achieve a positive 
DC offset with a continuous sinusoidal attack signal, albeit with slightly higher power levels. 
3.3 IEMI attack using continuous sawtooth waveform 
By using continuous sinusoidal signal, the attacker attempt to inject false data into digital 
sensors did not prove successful in creating 100% misreads. Without achieving 100% 
misread, this attack method cannot be claimed as being deterministically injecting false data. 
But, by using continuous sawtooth waveform transmitted as an attack signal, it would be 
possible to induce a net positive/negative DC average, over a period of time. The theory 
behind the use of sawtooth waveform has been discussed in detail in the section 4.1.3 in page 
77. In this section, equation (4-5) states that the voltage induced at the victim circuit will be 
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directly proportional to the negative derivative of the time varying current that flows through 
the transmitting antenna. Thus, the author hypothesizes that, by using a sawtooth waveform 
signal with fast changing falling edge, as the attack signal, the coupled signal at the victim 
circuit would have a positive DC offset. According to equation (4-5), the derivative of 
sawtooth signal, with fast falling edge, would be a constant positive DC, which occurs during 
the slow rising edge, and a negative DC offset, with larger amplitude, for a shorter duration, 
which occurs during the fast falling edge. Hence, the author hypothesizes that, the frequency 
characteristics of the victim circuit would result in an imbalance between the DC offsets 
induced during the slow rising edge and fast falling edge, thus resulting in a net positive or 
negative DC offset. 
 
Figure 3-9 Experimental setup for injecting false data using sawtooth waveform 
Figure 3-9 shows the experimental setup used for injecting false data into digital sensors 
using sawtooth waveform. The main difference from the setup shown by Figure 3-5 and 
Figure 3-9 happens to be the use of solenoid as the transmitting antenna. This may seem 
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counterintuitive, since sawtooth waveform is a wideband signal and usually solenoids are 
preferred for use with narrow band signals. But, since the arbitrary function generator 
AFG3021B, from Tektronix, available in the lab where the experiment was conducted, can 
only generate up to 12.5 MHz, the Vivaldi antenna used in the previous experiments would 
not be suitable to transmit, this low frequency signal. Hence, the author decided to use a 
solenoid instead of designing an antenna, which could transmit a sawtooth waveform with 
couple of MHz frequency, since the dimensions of the antenna would be very large. 
 
Figure 3-10 Oscilloscope image showing sawtooth attack signal and the induced signal at the 
victim circuit's GPIO pin 
3.3.1 Experimental results and discussion 
Figure 3-10 shows the 1.7 MHz sawtooth waveform, transmitted from the arbitrary 
function generator, while the induced signal at the victim circuit, shown by dark blue graph, 
demonstrates the induction of a positive DC offset at the instances when the falling edge of 
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sawtooth waveform occurs. As indicated by the ‘CycleMean’ parameter, the net DC offset 
was 210 mV, even though the induced positive DC offset had a large magnitude of 13 V.  
Although, intuitively one would think about increasing the frequency of the sawtooth 
signal, to create more frequent positive DC offset induction, but the results from Figure 3-11, 
which was obtained by transmitting sawtooth waveform with 2 MHz frequency, suggests 
otherwise. This figure shows that the induced signal at the GPIO input pin, has oscillations 
along with a positive DC offset. These oscillations could have occurred due to the frequency 
characteristics of the solenoid, used to transmit this signal, which results in a decrease in the 
net positive DC offset. In Figure 3-11, value shown by the parameter ‘CycleMean’ was 
incorrect. This is because, at the time of performing this experiment, the oscilloscope used to 
capture this image could not trigger the induced signal properly, thus resulting in constant 
change of values shown by ‘CycleMean’ parameter. 
 
Figure 3-11 Oscilloscope image showing high frequency sawtooth attack signal and the 
resultant induced signal at the victim circuit 
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To demonstrate that this attack technique could still improve the percentage of misreads, 
compared to the sinusoidal signal attack, the total number of misreads where calculated at the 
receiving microcontroller, while the transmitting microcontroller sends a digital logic 0. It 
was observed that the percentage of misreads improved to 47%, which was higher than the 
40.3% misread achieved using continuous sinusoidal signal attack. Thus, these results prove 
the author’s hypothesis about the sawtooth signal inducing a net positive or negative DC 
offset. But, the amplitude of induced positive or negative DC offset was far too low, while 
considering the amplitude of the induced positive or negative signal peaks. 
Figure 3-10 shows that the induced positive DC offset has an amplitude of ~4 V, for a 
duration of about ~800 ns. By positioning this positive DC offset precisely at the sampling 
window of the receiving microcontroller, an IEMI attacker could deterministically flip a 
digital logic ‘0’, transmitted towards a GPIO input terminal, into a digital logic ‘1’. Similar 
technique could be used by transmitting a sawtooth waveform with fast rising edge and slow 
falling edge, to flip a ‘1’ bit to ‘0’, deterministically. 
The caveat in this attack exist in the need for synchronization of a attack signal with the 
sampling clock of the receiving microcontroller. This is because, the induced positive DC 
offset can only exist for a short duration of time and to make a deterministic change in bits, 
the attack sawtooth signal’s falling edge should occur right around the sampling window of 
the receiving microcontroller. Since, digital circuits are usually noisy, due to radiation of EM 
energy during rising and falling transitions in its signals, it is a trivial task to build a circuit 
which can detect these rising/falling edges and use this data to synchronize the attacker’s 
signal. 
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However, this attack technique shows that the sawtooth waveform is a prime candidate 
for injecting false data into digital sensors, due to its ability to deterministically induce a bit 
flip, once the attack signal is synchronized with the sampling clock of the receiving 
microcontroller. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The attack techniques described in this chapter proves that an IEMI attack signal can 
induce false data into digital sensors. With continuous sinusoidal signal attack, although the 
expected shift in DC levels were far less prominent, in comparison to the analog sensor case, 
still the successful attack proves the vulnerability present in embedded systems. Also, the 
proposed attack using sawtooth waveform, shows its potential in deterministically inducing 
false data, but requires synchronization with the sampling clock of the victim circuit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FALSE DATA INJECTION FOR ACTUATORS 
 
Actuators are mechanical elements which are responsible for motion in a system. Any 
component in a machine which causes a rotation or movement can be considered as an 
actuator. In automobiles, actuators are responsible for moving the dials in the instrument 
cluster, which shows the vehicle speed, engine rotations per minute (rpm), fuel level and 
engine coolant temperature. They are also responsible for automatic windows, doors, side 
mirrors and many more. In robotics, the actuators play a predominant role in making a robot 
move in different direction using wheels, rotate its head, eyes, hands and legs, for a 
humanoid, as well as making facial expressions, such as moving the position of the mouth or 
eyebrows, etc.  
Just as the sensors being an integral part of an embedded system, enabling the system to 
evaluate its environment, the actuators play an important part in these systems, by enabling 
them to make a physical change in that environment. There are countless number of 
embedded systems with actuators, that we take for granted in our day to day lives. One such 
system is the automatic doors at the entrance of most businesses, airports, hospitals, etc. 
Automatic door systems using a sensor to sense an approaching human towards the door, 
using a pressure sensor located on the floor, IR sensor or ultrasonic sensor located on the top 
of the door. This sensor data will be sent to an embedded system, which hunts for particular 
level of change in the data and matches it with certain preset parameters, to determine the 
approach of a human. Once the embedded system determines that a human is approaching 
the door, it sends out electrical signals to actuators, which then perform the mechanical 
action of opening the door. Using similar measurements from the sensor, the embedded 
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system detects that movement of a human away from the door and activates the actuator 
mechanism to close the door. 
Even though we experience these innovations in our day to day life, they are hardly given 
any importance. Many such actuators are responsible for critical components in many of our 
machines which are responsible for keeping us alive. For example, the proper operation of 
the power steering system in a car or the landing gear mechanism of an aircraft are extremely 
important to keep the occupants safe. This problem is further exacerbated by the 
computerization of virtually every machine in our lives. Primary example for this would be 
drive-by-wire or brake-by-wire systems in modern vehicles. Auto manufacturers tend to 
support the computerization of systems in a vehicle, since they are extremely efficient 
compared to a mechanical system, while offering several comfort features, such as changing 
the throttle response or braking intensity, as with the drive-by-wire and brake-by-wire 
systems, respectively. 
Despite the amount of trust, we place in these electro-mechanical systems, there is hardly 
any research conducted to expose the possible security vulnerabilities of these actuators. In 
recent times, the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant has made it clear, 
that the kind of damage a vulnerability in embedded system could cause [45]. Stuxnet was a 
malicious computer worm, which subverted the control systems responsible for the 
centrifuge systems in the nuclear enrichment facility. This attack let to the destruction of the 
centrifuge system by manipulating the control signals, so that the centrifuge spins at speeds 
beyond the safe operating range of the machine [45]. 
 Since the Stuxnet attack was performed by traditional computer hacking techniques, 
in which hackers took advantage of the security vulnerabilities in the computers used in the 
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nuclear facility, the future attack using these vulnerabilities could be prevented with 
appropriate software patches, for the attacked computer systems. But, the vulnerabilities 
existing in the current generation of actuators, which could be exploited using IEMI 
techniques, require complete redesign of the actuators to prevent against this attack 
technique. 
Like the IEMI attacks described in the previous chapters, this attack against the actuators 
aims at injecting false data into the control signals used to drive these systems. Most digital 
actuators, such as servo motors, uses Pulse-Width-Modulation (PWM) signals to move/ turn 
the actuators to a desired position. PWM signals consist of series of pulses with a specific 
pulse width, which dictates the actuator to reposition itself depending on the pulse width of a 
control signal. Digital servos are most commonly found in Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV), 
robots and quadcopters. Since the existing security measures against malicious attacks 
involves encrypting the data in the embedded systems, these actuator control signals are 
highly susceptible to attacks from IEMI technique. Using this attack, an attacker can 
remotely control the servo motor’s operation, without the control system’s knowledge. 
Before exploring the vulnerability in the actuator control signals, one must understand the 
mechanisms with which an actuator such as a digital servo interprets the incoming control 
signal and the control mechanism behind the armature positioning system. 
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Figure 4-1 Block diagram of servo motor and control circuit 
 
Figure 4-1 shows a block diagram of a digital servo motor and its control circuit. The 
PWM control signal generated by a microcontroller is received by an on-board 
microcontroller circuit, which determines the pulse width of the periodic pulses, by detecting 
the time difference between rising and falling edges. Based on the determined pulse width of 
the PWM signal, the microcontroller sends out DC power to rotate the armature position. The 
armature position is sensed by a sensor and generates a voltage signal, which would be sent 
back as a feedback signal to the microcontroller. This armature position sensor could be 
made with a simple potentiometer, which rotates in conjunction with the armature, thus 
providing different resistances based on the rotation angle of the armature. This varying 
resistance can be converted into a varying voltage signal, by sending a constant current 
through the potentiometer. The feedback signal from the armature position sensor would be 
analyzed by the microcontroller to determine whether the armature has rotated to a desired 
position. If the armature has reached a desired position, the microcontroller cuts the DC 
power, thus maintaining the desired angle of rotation, until a change in the pulse width of the 
PWM signal was detected. Figure 4-2 shows an example of different pulse widths and the 
corresponding angle of rotation of the servo motor’s armature. In this figure, every 0.5 ms 
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change in the pulse width of the PWM signal, corresponds to 900 rotation of the armature 
angle. 
 
Figure 4-2 PWM control signals and the corresponding degree of rotation of the actuator's 
armature 
4.1 Mechanism of attack for actuator 
The difference in the IEMI attack for analog sensors versus the actuators, is that the 
actuator attacker needs to transmit EM signal in-phase with the PWM signal generated from 
an embedded system. This is important, if the attacker wants to rotate the actuator’s armature 
to a desired angle. Unlike the analog sensor IEMI attack, the induction of DC signal at the 
victim circuit must happen around the existing pulses in the PWM signal, to change the pulse 
width of the periodic signal. Also, the attack to change in pulse width should be performed 
on the all the pulses in the periodic PWM signal, to maintain the rotation of actuator angle at 
a desired position. 
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Since the PWM control signal usually has sharp rising/falling edges in its waveform, 
these signals tend to contain several harmonics of the fundamental frequency. Therefore, it 
would be easy to detect the rising/falling edges in the PWM control signal, due to the 
tendency of high frequency components in the control signal to be radiated [46]. An attacker 
should be able to design an antenna which can pick up these high frequency components 
radiated from the PWM signal path and use the information to detect the rising/falling edges. 
Since, this task is trivial, this chapter instead will focus on the improving the effectiveness of 
IEMI attack on actuators, by exploring suitable waveforms and design for attacker circuit. 
All the IEMI attacks described in this chapter were performed under the near-field distance 
of the transmitting antenna. 
The author chose to use a digital servo motor S3152 from Futaba, to serve as the actuator 
under attack [47]. This servo motor is most suitable for small toys as well as quadcopters, 
due to its light weight design (41 g) and compact package with dimensions of 40 x 20 x 
38mm. 
This digital servo motor responds to PWM signals with pulse widths ranging from 0.8 ms 
to 2.1 ms, with a maximum of 50 ms time period, which corresponds to 00 to 1800 angle of 
armature rotation. Experimentally it was found that, while operating the servo motor with 5 
V DC supply, the lowest amplitude of PWM signal which successfully controls the 
armature’s rotation was 1 V. Since it would be easier to inject false data into the PWM signal 
having lower amplitude, using a low power IEMI attack, the author has used PWM signals 
with 1 V amplitude to demonstrate all the attacks on the servo motor. 
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4.2 Continuous sinusoidal attack 
Since the servo motor has an on-board microcontroller, the first attempt to induce 
required amount of DC voltage was attempted by using continuous sinusoidal signal. The 
author hypothesizes that, the on-board microcontroller would have non-linearity, with AC to 
DC conversion efficiency high enough to produce significant DC offset, and to change the 
logic levels of the PWM signal. Figure 4-3 shows the experimental setup for the IEMI attack 
on actuators with continuous sinusoidal signal. This experiment hopes to determine the 
effects of continuous AC signal coupling to the victim circuit. The transmitting Vivaldi 
antenna was replaced by a solenoid, since the Vivaldi antenna does not perform well under 
low frequencies (< 200 MHz), which can be seen from the Figure 2-9. 
 
Figure 4-3 Experimental setup for continuous sinusoidal signal attack 
The PWM control signal was generated using an Arbitrary Function Generator 
AFG3021B from Tektronix. Although the PWM control signal for the servo motor could be 
generated using a microcontroller, using an arbitrary function generator provides the freedom 
to change the pulse amplitude as well as the pulse width, without having to change the 
program inside the microcontroller. The PWM signal path was intercepted and connected to 
an oscilloscope, to identify the effect of coupling an AC signal to the actuator.  
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4.2.1 Experimental results and discussion 
The frequency of the sinusoidal signal transmitted from the attacker was swept to find 
the frequencies at which maximum power transfer takes place, which would be close to the 
resonant frequency of the attacker circuit as well as the victim circuit. The results from this 
experiment showed that, there was no DC voltage generated because of the coupled AC 
signal. This could be due to the use of different kind of ESD diodes inside the onboard 
microcontroller, which resulted in negligible amount of rectification of the coupled AC 
signal. But, while transmitting sinusoidal signals from 7 MHz to 13 MHz, the servo motor 
stopped responding to PWM control signal and behaved as it was powered off. 
The reason for this unresponsive was due to the superposition of the PWM signal and 
the sinusoidal attack signal, which resulted in a waveform shown in Figure 4-3. This figure 
was taken from an oscilloscope, which seems to show three different waveforms. However, 
the oscilloscope image is showing data from two channels, connected to the PWM signal 
path and the continuous sinusoidal attack signal path (dark blue waveform). Since the 
oscilloscope tries to continuously sample the incoming signal and display the results, the 
PWM signal with ON (1 V) and OFF (0 V) regions are merged together and displayed on the 
same region of screen. 
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Figure 4-4 Oscilloscope screenshot showing continuous sinusoidal attack signal and PWM 
signal 
Figure 4-4 shows the PWM signal superimposed with the coupled attack signal, 
which results in the ON pulse of the PWM signal consisting of regions with highest voltage 
of 1.25 V and lowest voltage of 750 mV. These 750 mV regions in the ON pulse of the PWM 
signal, was read as digital zeros, while the signal regions above 750 mV would be considered 
as digital ones, by the onboard microcontroller. But, when the microcontroller looks for 
rising edges in the PWM signal, which represents the presence of periodic pulses in the 
signal, received PWM signal would appear to be devoid of any rising edges, which results in 
the digital servo motor assuming that the PWM control signal consist of all zeros. This 
unresponsive state of the servo motor vanished, when the amplitude of the PWM control 
signal was increased by 10 mV above the minimum required 1 V PWM amplitude, upon 
which the servo motor responds to PWM control signal, as expected. 
 The attack signal frequencies from 7 MHz to 13 MHz, in which the digital servo 
motor switches to unresponsive state, must be related to the frequencies at which the 
73 
 
amplitude of the coupled sinusoidal signal is larger than 500 mVp-p. These frequencies must 
be close to the resonant frequency of the solenoid or the victim circuit. 
 Although this attack was successful and could push a digital servo motor into an 
unresponsive state by injecting false data into the PWM control signal, this result was not 
enough to satisfy the initial goals set to arbitrarily control an actuator. Also, these results 
disprove the hypothesis of the author, because of the insignificant amount of the DC offset 
induced by the non-linearities resent at the input terminal of on-board microcontroller. 
4.3 Pulsed sinusoidal attack 
Equipped with the knowledge gained from previous experiment, the author hypothesizes 
that, transmitting a pulsed sinusoidal signal positioned before the falling edge of the PWM 
pulses, would result in a net increase in the pulse width of the PWM pulses. This is because, 
after receiving the rising edge of the ON pulse, the on-board microcontroller would be unable 
to detect an OFF region of the PWM signal, due to the presence of coupled sinusoidal signal. 
The experimental setup for the attack attempting to increase the PWM pulse width is 
shown in Figure 4-5. Attacker circuit shown in Figure 4-5 is similar to the circuit in chapter 
2, but with certain differences. One important change in the attacker circuit for the actuator 
case comes from the use of RF switch. This RF switch component named as ZASWA-2-
50DR+, was a high isolation Single-Pole-Double-Throw (SPDT) switch from Minicircuits, 
which can switch its output from fully ON to fully OFF stages, while maintaining 50Ω output 
impedance. The arbitrary function generator (AFG3021B from Tektronix) shown in Figure 
4-5, generates pulses, which acts as the control signal for the RF switch. Although not shown 
explicitly in Figure 4-5, there was a clock synchronization connection between the two 
arbitrary function generators, which generates the control signal for the RF switch on the 
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attacker side and the PWM signal at the victim side. The pulse width of the signal generated 
from the attacker’s arbitrary function generator was set to 400 μs, with a pulse period of 50 
ms, which was the same as the PWM signal’s period, generated from the victim’s arbitrary 
function generator. The pulse width of the PWM signal generated at the victim circuit was set 
to 1 ms. The pulsed sinusoidal signal was fed to the Vivaldi antenna, to radiate the attack 
signal towards the victim actuator circuit. 
 
Figure 4-5 Pulsed sinusoidal attack on actuator 
The frequency of the transmitted sinusoidal signal set to 10 MHz, since it was found from the 
previous experiment that signals transmitted from 7 MHz to 13 MHz were having maximum 
power transfer between the attacker and the victim circuits.  
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Figure 4-6 Oscilloscope measurement of the pulsed sinusoidal signal from the attacker and 
the coupled signal at the victim's PWM signal path 
4.3.1 Experimental results and discussion 
Figure 4-6 shows the pulsed sinusoidal signal generated using a 10 MHz sinusoidal 
signal that is synchronized with the PWM signal, so that when this attack signal couples onto 
the victim circuit, the induced signal would disrupt the pulse width of the PWM control 
signal.  
Figure 4-7 shows the coupled pulsed sinusoidal signal getting superimposed with the 
PWM control signal, precisely at the end of the ON pulses. The figure does not show clearly 
the presence of pulsed sinusoidal signal, since it is difficult for the oscilloscope’s trigger to 
lock on to the phase of the pulses as well as the sinusoidal signal. Hence the regions of the 
PWM signal which has the coupled sinusoidal signal, appears as a distortion in the DC 
voltage levels, although it is far from the truth. 
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Figure 4-7 Oscilloscope screenshot showing the pulsed sinusoidal attack signal superimposed 
on the PWM control signal 
 
Figure 4-7 shows the PWM signal with pulse width of ~1 ms, while the attack signal 
consisting of sinusoidal pulses exists for ~1 ms. It was observed during the experiment that 
the servo motor’s armature precisely rotates to an angle corresponding to ~2 ms, despite the 
original PWM signal having pulse width of 1 ms. The rotation angle of the servo motor’s 
armature, returns to the position corresponding to 1 ms, when the attack signal was switched 
off. 
This result seemingly proves the author’s hypothesis, by suggesting that, the onboard 
microcontroller tries to look for a falling edge after the original PWM signal’s ON pulse, but 
fails to find this, due to the presence of sinusoidal signal. The OFF region of the PWM pulse 
would be detected when the pulsed sinusoidal signal disappears. But, if this hypothesis was 
completely accurate, then by positioning the sinusoidal pulses before the rising edge of the 
PWM ON pulses, the net pulse width should decrease. However, such an experiment resulted 
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in the servo motor’s armature rotating to a new angle, corresponding to the increase in pulse 
width, resulted due to the superposition of PWM ON pulses and pulsed sinusoidal attack 
signal. This suggests that the author’s hypothesis that the on-board microcontroller not being 
able to detect the rising or falling edge of the PWM signal might not be accurate. Despite the 
disproval of this hypothesis, the experimental results suggest that pulsed sinusoidal signal 
could be used to increase the pulse width of PWM signal. 
4.4 Saw tooth waveform attack 
As mentioned earlier, the best approach to arbitrarily control an actuator is by 
injecting false data around the ON pulses of the PWM signal, in a synchronized way, thereby 
changing its pulse width. In the previous experiment, this change in the pulse width was 
caused by inducing pulsed sinusoidal signal. This effect could also be caused at the victim 
circuit by transmitting waveforms that would induce a sharp change in the voltage at the 
victim’s circuit.  
It was experimentally determined that the Futaba S3152 digital servo detects any 
rising/falling edge every 800 us, which corresponds to the minimum acceptable pulse width 
of the PWM signal. Hence, any sudden drop in the DC level, during an ON pulse, would 
result in the onboard microcontroller assuming that the pulse width of the PWM signal has 
decreased. 
The author hypothesizes that, transmitting saw tooth waveform with fast rising edge, 
it could induce a drop in DC level, for a short duration in the PWM signal, thereby reducing 
the pulse width. Like the previous experiment, this attack technique also requires 
synchronization of the PWM signal and the attack signal. Before the details of the attacking 
circuit can be discussed, it is important to understand the mechanism behind the sawtooth 
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waveform’s ability to induce DC level shift for a short duration of time at the victim’s PWM 
signal. 
 
Figure 4-8 EM coupling model demonstrating Faraday's law 
Figure 4-8 shows the EM coupling model in which a time varying current i(t) flows 
through an infinitely long conductor, represented by the cylinder, in +z direction. The H-field 
generated due to this current flow exists in a perpendicular direction to the x-z plane, which 
is represented by the letter ‘H’ above a circle with a cross. At a distance ‘d’, which is under 
the near-field conditions, there exists a conducting loop with dimensions a x b. This EM 
coupling model would be used to estimate the time varying voltage ‘v(t)’ induced at the 
conducting loop, which represents the victim circuit, due to the current ‘i(t)’, which 
represents the current flow in the attacker circuit. 
The magnitude of the H-field generated from the conductor carrying ‘i(t)’ can be 
found using the following equation: 
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 𝐻 = ŷ
𝑖(𝑡)
2𝜋𝑥
 (4-1) 
Using Faraday’s law, the voltage induced at the conducting loop, due to the time varying H-
field can be calculated as, 
 𝑣(𝑡) = ∮ 𝐸. 𝑑𝑙 = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∬ 𝐵. 𝑑𝑠 = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∬ 𝜇𝐻. 𝑑𝑠 (4-2) 
where, 
 𝑑𝑆 =  ŷ 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑧 (4-3) 
The variable 𝜇 in equation (4-2) represents permeability. 
Thus, the induced voltage v(t) can be estimated as, 
 𝑣(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑖(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
∫
𝜇
2𝜋𝑥
𝑑𝑥
𝑑+𝑎
𝑑
∫ 𝑑𝑧 
𝑏
0
 (4-4) 
 𝑣(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑖(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
[
𝜇
2𝜋
𝑏 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑑 + 𝑎
𝑑
)] (4-5) 
Equation (4-5) shows that the relationship between the current flow in the attacker’s 
transmitter and the voltage induced at the victim circuit has a time derivative relation. Figure 
4-9 shows the relation between the current at the transmitting cylinder and the voltage 
induced at the conducting loop, which is present at a distance of 1 cm, using the equation 
(4-5). For the purpose of this calculation it was assumed that the cylinder and the conducting 
loop are present in vacuum and the conducting loop has a dimension of 1 cm x 1 cm.  
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Figure 4-9 MATLAB plot comparing the current at the transmitter with the voltage induced 
at the victim circuit 
Figure 4-9 shows that for a duration less than ~1 ms, the time varying current in the 
cylinder induces a voltage drop at the conducting loop. The magnitude of the induced voltage 
at the conducting loop is in the order of nV, since the H-field emitted from the transmitting 
cylinder is only partially coupled with the conducting loop and also, the loop’s dimension is 
directly proportional to the magnitude of the voltage induced. 
As seen by Figure 4-9, if the voltage drop was induced in-between the ON pulses of 
the PWM control signal at the victim circuit, then the onboard microcontroller inside the 
servo would consider these voltage drops as falling edge and assumes that the pulse width of 
the PWM signal has been reduced. Thus, the sawtooth waveform transmitted by the attacker 
needs to have a frequency and phase same as that of the PWM signal. 
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4.4.1 Transmitter circuit design 
This section has used materials that were published in the paper “Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation: Design of a stimulator and a focused coil for the application of small 
animals”, by J. Selvaraj et. al, with the permission of all the authors [48]. 
Unlike transmitting a narrow band sinusoidal signal, the sawtooth waveform occupies a 
wider bandwidth, due to the sharp changes in its waveform. Vivaldi antenna is an excellent 
candidate to transmit a wideband waveform, as discussed in the page 21, but the required 
frequency of sawtooth waveform would be too low (20 𝐻𝑧 =  
1
50 𝑚𝑠
). This is because, the 
dimension of the antenna is related to the longest wavelength of the signal which needs to be 
transmitted and the wavelength of the 20 Hz signal would be 15000 km, which would be 
unreasonably huge for an antenna. Hence, the author decided to use solenoids to couple the 
wideband attack signal to the victim circuit. 
 Even though the solenoid does not have a wideband bandwidth characteristic, the 
frequency components of a 20 Hz sawtooth signal should not be high enough to cause any 
impedance mismatch, due to its long wavelengths. 
 The next challenge in using this attack technique involves transmitting a large amount 
of power from the attacker. This large power requirement can be understood from equation 
(4-5), which states that the amplitude of the voltage induced at the victim circuit would be 
directly proportional to the victim circuit’s dimension and the current through the transmitter. 
With the assumptions made for making the MATLAB plot shown in Figure 4-9, the 
amplitude of the current needs to be ~166 MA to achieve a 500 mV drop in voltage at the 
victim circuit. This unreasonably large current requirement can be reduced by using a 
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solenoid which generates a much stronger H-field for a given current as compared against an 
infinitely long conductor. 
 𝐵 =  𝜇 
𝑁
𝐿
 𝐼 (4-6) 
 Equation (4-6) states the magnetic field intensity generate by a solenoid, which has its 
length ‘L’ much larger than the diameter of the coils. In this equation, ‘N’ represents the 
number of turns in the solenoid, while ‘I’ represents the time varying current flowing through 
the it. Thus, by increasing the permeability 𝜇, number of turns ‘N’ or by decreasing the 
length ‘L’, the magnitude of current required to induce the necessary voltage drop can be 
reduced. 
 Thus, by using a material with its relative permeability value as 1000 and by using a 
solenoid with 
𝑁
𝐿
 value in the order of 1000, the magnitude of current required to induce a 
~500 mV DC offset at the victim circuit can be reduced by an order of 106. Along with all 
these techniques to reduce the required transmitted power, the distance between the 
transmitting solenoid and the victim circuit can be reduced to help with the reduction in 
required current magnitude. However, it is important not to increase the inductance of the 
solenoid to the order of several milli Henry, which would significantly reduce the bandwidth 
of the solenoid, thereby increasing the rise or fall times of a sawtooth waveform, even though 
the frequency of the waveform is 20 Hz. 
 The author decided to design a circuit which can generate a sawtooth waveform 
current with 1000 A magnitude and drive it into a solenoid with a high permeability core 
material. 
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Figure 4-10 Schematic of the attacker circuit 
Figure 4-10 shows the schematic of the attacker’s circuit, which has been divided into 
three main sections: AC to DC converter/rectifier, voltage step down and load with high 
current switch. 
In the rectifier section, 115 VAC signal from the US power outlet was converted to 
DC voltage with the help of two diodes and a capacitor (C1, D1 and D2). These diodes and 
capacitors form the voltage doubler circuit. The relay connected at the input of the voltage 
doubler circuit was controlled by the microcontroller, which reads the output voltage from 
the rectifier and shuts down the rectifier circuit, when the circuit is not in use, so that 
overheating issues could be prevented. 
The converted DC voltage is applied across the Potentiometer (Pot), which is a 
variable resistor, using which the voltage can be stepped down to required value. Ability to 
control the DC voltage connected to the switching transistor will allow the user to change the 
bias condition of the transistor, there by changing the magnitude of current flowing through 
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it. The output DC current from the rectifier and the voltage step down stages was used to 
charge the capacitor C3, which would filter out the noise from the rectification process. 
In the final stage, C3 is connected to the inductive load (L1), which has the feedback 
path connected to the resistors for the dissipation of the return power. Diodes (D3-D5) are 
used to make sure that the current travels only in one direction, during the discharge cycle. 
Transistor (Q2) acts as a high current switch, while the microcontroller feeds the control 
signal to the switching system. Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor (IGBT) was used to 
function as the switching transistor, due to its ability to support high current, with minimal 
switching resistance. Current sense resistor (R5) is used to measure the current across the 
transistor, while the resistor R7 was used to discharge any residual charge stored in the gate 
of the transistor, which might prevent the switching transistor from fully shutting down. 
Design considerations for AC to DC converter/rectifier: 
Capacitor C1 would be charged and discharged every half cycle of the 60 Hz 
sinusoidal signal, coming from the 115V AC power outlet. Assuming 10 A of peak current 
flow through the AC to DC converter circuit, the capacitor C1 can be calculated and chosen 
using the equation (4-7). 
 𝐶1 =  
𝐼 𝑡
𝑉
 (4-7) 
In equation (4-7), ‘I’ represents the average current flowing through the capacitor in 
one half cycle of the sinusoidal signal, which is 6.37 A (= 10 A × 0.637), while ‘t’ represents 
the half cycle of a sinusoidal period, which is 8.34 ms (= 
1
2×60 𝐻𝑧
). ‘V’ represents the average 
voltage experienced by the capacitor C1, which can be calculated as 73.255 V (=115 V × 
0.637). Thus, the minimum value of C1 can be calculated as ~725 µF. The authors have 
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chosen to use a 1200 µF capacitor, with a voltage rating of 250 V, which is beyond the 
required 115 V rating, to provide a more stable operation, under high current loads. 
Ignoring any voltage loss across the diodes D1 and D2, the potentiometer which had a 
total resistance of 1 kΩ would experience a total voltage of about 230 V, across them, due to 
the voltage doubler outputting an DC voltage with magnitude twice that of the peak voltage 
of AC input signal. Hence these resistors need to handle a minimum of 52.9 W (=
𝑉2
𝑅
=
 
2302
1000
). Thus, the 1 kΩ potentiometer was chosen with 100 W power rating to have extra 
headroom in terms of power dissipation. 
The relay connected between the AC power outlet and capacitor C1 was used to shut 
down the charging circuit, whenever the switching transistor is not operating. This would 
prevent the potentiometer from getting heated up, since the potentiometer would constantly 
drain 230 mA (
230 𝑉
1000 Ω
), which would constantly heat the potentiometer and might result in 
failure of this component. The control signal for this relay was sent by the microcontroller, 
which determines the instances when the switching transistor is not under operation. 
Power Rating Design Consideration for Voltage Step Down Stage: 
Capacitor C3 serves as the charge storage bank, which would supply the required 
amount of charge during the transmission of sawtooth waveform, while maintaining a stable 
collector to emitter voltage across the IGBT transistor. The discharge cycle represents the 
duration of time, in which current flows through the solenoid. Equation (4-8) describes the 
calculation of minimum capacitance for C3. 
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 𝐶3 =  
𝐼 𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 − 𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
 (4-8) 
In equation (4-8), ‘I’ and ‘t’ represents the average current and time, like equation 
(4-7), while Vinitial and Vfinal represents the initial capacitor voltage before the discharge 
cycle and final capacitor voltage after the discharge cycle, respectively. Ignoring any 
additional drop in voltage across the diodes D1 and D2, the maximum value of Vinitial can 
be 230 V, from the voltage doubler, while the value of Vfinal was assumed to be 30 V. The 
200 V difference between the initial and final voltage values should not cause any issues for 
the transmitted power, since IGBTs are very resilient to minor changes in the collector to 
emitter voltage [49]. 
The required current flow through the coil was 1000 A (= I). Assuming that an 
attacker would like to interfere with the digital servo motor for a duration of 1 s (= t), the 
minimum required capacitance value of C3 was calculated as 5 F. This shorter duration of 
time to inject false data and thus control the servo motor was chosen to keep the capacitance 
value low, thereby bringing the cost of the overall circuit low. Despite this shorter duration, 5 
F was a large amount of capacitance. The author decided on using 10 mF capacitor, to design 
a cost-effective circuit, which would serve as a proof of concept for this attack. Although, 
this circuit would only support a single cycle of sawtooth waveform transmission, its 
capability can be improved by adding additional capacitors in parallel. 
Switching Transistor Power Rating Design Consideration 
The resistors (R2) was built using 20 resistors in parallel, which were used to 
dissipate the energy after the transistor shuts off completely, to avoid any return power to the 
transistor or control circuits, which were connected to the gate of transistor. These 20 
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resistors connected in parallel reduces the cost compared to having a single resistor, as the 
resistors cost increases with the rated wattage. If 1000 A flows through the 20 resistors, each 
with 0.2 Ω resistance, during the discharge cycle, then 500 watts (= 𝐼2𝑅 =  (
1000
20
)
2
× 0.2) 
rating per resistor is required. But, this would be the requirement for resistor power rating, if 
1000 A of current continuously flows through the resistors. The authors have chosen resistors 
rated at 100 watts, since it should be enough to handle 500 watts of current during 100 us 
(assuming 100 us to the discharge time), which would be significantly less in terms of 
dissipated energy (= power x discharge time). 
The voltage developed across the IGBT transistor (Q2) was due to supply voltage and 
from the voltage developed across the load coil, when current flows through it. During the 
fall time of the pulse, the voltage polarity across the inductor is reversed, resulting in a net 
voltage appearing across the collector-emitter nodes of the transistor, as the summation of 
inductor voltage and supply voltage. But, due to the long falling time of the sawtooth 
waveform used for this attack, which is ~50 ms, the inductor voltage developed during the 
rising edge is much more critical to manage than the voltage developed during the falling 
edge. Assuming that the rising edge of the sawtooth waveform to be 100 ns, the voltage 
developed across the inductor can be calculated by the following equation.       
 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑 = 𝐿 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
 (4-9) 
Using equation (4-9), the inductor voltage can be estimated as 200 V, if the 
inductance of the solenoid was assumed as 200 V. The author decided to use a IGBT 
transistor with voltage rating of 1200 V and current rating of 800 A (pulsed current over 1 
ms) for the safe and stable operation range of the transistor.  
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The last component which needs to have its power rating estimated was the current 
sense resistor. This component would allow the attacker to verify the rise/fall times of the the 
sawtooth waveform using an oscilloscope connected across this resistor. The current sense 
resistor was chosen with a resistance of 0.5 mΩ and 100 W power rating. Despite the need to 
handle 500 watts (= 10002 × 0.5𝑚Ω), since, the current sense resistor will only be operated 
for a shorter duration of time, due to the limited size of capacitor C3, the author decided to 
use this particular current sense resistor. 
Buffer circuit: 
 The buffer circuit used to control the switching transistor was built as a simple digital 
inverter, which boosts the incoming signal to a specified voltage. 
 
Figure 4-11 Buffer circuit used to boost the signal from microcontroller to gate terminal of 
IGBT 
 Figure 4-11 shows the buffer circuit used to boost the sawtooth waveform the has its 
voltage ranging from 0 V to 3.3 V. The output waveform from this buffer circuit was an 
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inverted version of the signal from the microcontroller, with boosted voltage levels ranging 
from 0 V to VDC. Because of the buffer circuit, it was relatively easy to control the output 
current from the attacker circuit, since the output current from the switching IGBT transistor 
has a strong dependence on the voltage levels at its gate terminal [49]. 
Table 4-1. Summary of the components used in the attacker circuit. 
Name Labels in Figure 4-10 Values and power ratings 
Capacitor C1 1200 µF, 250 V 
Diodes D1 and D2 15ETH03PBF-ND, 300V, 
15A 
Potentiometer/Variable 
resistor 
Pot 1kohm, 100watts 
Resistor R6 1kohm, 100watts 
Discharge capacitor C3 10000 µF, 200 V 
Feedback resistors R2 0.2ohm, 100 watts 
Feedback diode D3 VS-1N1186GI, 200V, 35V 
Inductor L1 22 µH 
Insulated-Gate Bipolar 
Transistor (IGBT) 
Q2 FZ400R12KE4, 1200 V, 800 
A 
Diodes D4 and D5 1N4004DICT-ND, 400V, 
1A 
Current sense resistor R5 0.0005ohm,100 watts 
 
Figure 4-12 Attacker circuit 
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Figure 4-12 shows the designed attacker circuit with highlights on key components, 
such as, microcontroller, switching transistor, buffer and rectifier. The yellow perforated 
PCB board on the ride side of Figure 4-12 has the potentiometer and 20 resistors (R2), along 
with the current sense resistors (R5). The sawtooth signal was applied to the circuit using a 
microcontroller circuit board, which was mounted on the side walls of this circuit. The power 
rating for each component used, was calculated above the required power rating for better 
durability. Several ground bars are used for stable connections to ground, positive supply and 
for the connection between the solenoid and the capacitors.  
4.4.2 Experimental results and discussion 
Due to cost consideration, the attacker circuit was built to support sawtooth waveform 
transmission with 1000 A of current for 1 ms, due to the limited size of storage capacitor. 
Since 1 ms was less than the required period of sawtooth waveform, which was 50 ms, the 
attacker circuit would not be able to demonstrate a successful IEMI attack on digital servo 
motor. Hence, the author decided on reducing the output current level from the designed 
circuit to 200 mA, which would enable the attacker to sustain the attack for 5 seconds. 
However, the reduced output current from the attacker circuit would result in a decreased 
voltage induction at the victim circuit at 1 cm distance from the transmitter. To compensate 
for the reduced transmitted power, the victim circuit’s PWM signal cable was wrapped 
around the solenoid to enable better coupling, thus enabling improved coupling between the 
transmitter and victim circuits. 
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Figure 4-13 Experimental setup showing sawtooth waveform attack on digital servo motor 
Figure 4-13 shows the experimental setup used to demonstrate the IEMI attack on 
servo motor using sawtooth waveform. The cable carrying the PWM signal was wrapped 
around the solenoid, to form a secondary coil, with one turn, to increase the coupling 
between the transmitting solenoid and the victim circuit. The microcontroller’s clock was 
synchronized with the arbitrary function generator, which generates the PWM signal. The 
phase of the PWM signal was adjusted so that the rising edge of the sawtooth waveform 
aligns at the center of the PWM signal's ON pulses. Using the buffer circuit, the amplitude of 
signal applied to the gate terminal of the IGBT transistor was adjusted in such a way that, the 
output current flowing through the solenoid was 200 mA. 
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                                                       (a) 
 
                                                           (b) 
Figure 4-14 Oscilloscope image showing the sawtooth attack signal as well as the DC offset 
induced in the PWM signal 
Figure 4-14 shows the sawtooth attack signal and the induced DC offset at the PWM 
signal’s ON pulse. Figure 4-14 (b) shows the zoomed-in version of Figure 4-14 (a) around 
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the rising edge of the sawtooth waveform. This figure shows a 200 mV drop in the DC level 
for about ~50 ns. It was observed that the servo motor’s armature rotated successfully to a 
new angle, which was in accordance with the reduction in pulse width, due to the induced 
DC offset from the IEMI attack. This result proves the author’s hypothesis on sawtooth 
waveform’s ability to induce drop in the DC level for a shorter duration, resulting in a net 
reduction of the pulse width of PWM signal. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, three different IEMI attack techniques were demonstrated for injecting 
false data into the digital servo motor’s PWM control signal. The technique involving 
continuous sinusoidal signal transmission resulted in the digital servo motor entering an 
unresponsive state, while the pulsed sinusoidal signal could increase the pulse width of the 
PWM signal resulting in anti-clockwise rotation of the digital servo motor’s armature. The 
final attack technique demonstrated using a sawtooth waveform needed the design of a high 
current driver, which was successfully able to induce DC offset for a short duration, between 
the ON pulses of the PWM signal, resulting in clockwise rotation of the digital servo motor’s 
armature, in accordance to the net reduction in pulse width of the PWM control signal. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This chapter has used materials that were published in the paper “Enhancement for 
High-Speed Switching of Magneto-Optic Fiber-Based Routing Using Single Magnetizing 
Coil”, by J. Selvaraj et. al, with the permission of all the authors [50]. 
Being an active member or the High Speed Systems Engineering (HSSE) lab, I have 
been involved in related research.  One of the leading projects of the lab focus on improving 
the existing small magnetic pulse generator circuit, used to control magneto-optic switch. 
5.1 Introduction 
All-optical networking systems are being actively investigated to improve the speed 
of fiber-based communication systems [51] [52] [53] [54] [55]. The major bottleneck for 
switching speeds in current fiber-based systems comes from the optical-to-
electrical/electrical-to-optical conversion process handled by the routers in a network, since 
the maximum bandwidth of electrical systems are lower than that of the optical fibers. 
Magneto-Optic (MO) material with an interferometer setup are being explored to replace 
contemporary routers and remove this bottleneck, thereby enabling an all-optical network 
[56].  
MO materials alter the state-of-polarization (SoP) of the optical signals passing 
through an interferometer setup, which would result in constructive or destructive 
interference at the output ports. Also, MO materials has the capability to introduce varying 
levels of SoP for an optical signal, depending on the strength and direction of magnetic field 
applied to them. The phenomenon which causes an optical signal to experience a change in 
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the SoP is called Faraday rotation [56]. Thus, an MO material present in an optical 
interferometer setup could produce different levels of interference, with varying magnetic 
field strength, thereby achieving the capability to function as an all-optical router. Recently 
there has been several investigations on the techniques to improve the switching speed of 
such all-optical routers.  
Wu et al. has proposed a magnetic field generator circuit which can generate current 
pulses with 6-20 ns pulse width and 2-5 ns rise time [52]. Despite the shorter rise time, they 
showed that the fall time of the optical signal is in the order of 200 ns. Pritchard et al. has 
shown that the residual magnetic field present in the coil after the demagnetization process 
results in a slower fall time of optical signal [57]. They have proposed a two-coil system with 
two separate driver circuits, used to generate forward and reverse magnetic fields. With the 
help of the reverse magnetic field, Pritchard et al. showed that the fall time of optical output 
can be reduced to ~130 ns. But, the system suffered from a 10% reduction in the optical 
amplitude, due to interaction between the two coils, along with minor perturbation in the 
optical output under no-output conditions. In this paper, a new magnetic pulse generator 
system is proposed with a single coil and a single driver circuit. The newly proposed system 
generates magnetic field in forward and reverse direction, while achieving similar 
performance in terms of switching speed compared to previous works and reduced circuit 
complexity. 
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Figure 5-1 Proposed magnetic field generator circuit 
5.2 Magnetic Field Generator Circuit 
The proposed magnetic field generator circuit is shown in Figure 5-1. This circuit has 
an NMOS and PMOS transistor combination. PMOS circuit has been used to supply positive 
voltage from the DC source ‘V1’ to the coil ‘L1’, thus sending a forward current to the coil, 
while the NMOS circuit has been used to supply negative voltage from the DC source ‘V2’, 
thus sending a reverse current to the coil. Consequently, the coil will be able to produce 
magnetic field in forward or reverse direction, based on the direction of current flow. The 
supply voltages used in this circuit were +3.5V and -3.5V.  The capacitors C1 and C2 help to 
store positive and negative charges from the DC supply, which would be used during the fast 
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charging and discharging phases of the coil. The minimum size of the capacitors C1 and C2 
can be determined from the below equation. 
 𝑐 =  
𝐼 𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 − 𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
 (5-1) 
In equation (5-1), ‘I’ represents the peak current amplitude (amperes), while ‘t’ 
represents the amount of time (seconds), during which there would be current flow through 
the coil. ‘Vinitial’ represents the initial voltage (volts) of the capacitor, which would be equal 
to the supply voltage, while the ‘Vfinal’ represents the capacitor voltage after the duration ‘t’. 
In this study, the authors used ‘Vinitial’ and ‘Vfinal’ as 3.5 V and 3.4 V, respectively, while 
the required ‘I’ was ~10A and ‘t’ was 5 us. From equation (5-1), the minimum capacitance 
size for the proposed circuit would be 500 uF. Authors chose to use 3300 uF capacitors to 
have freedom in terms of the current amplitude and duration of current flow to the coil. 
 
Figure 5-2 Control signals for PMOS and NMOS transistors 
98 
 
To ensure that the current flow exists only between the DC sources and avoid direct 
connection between positive and negative DC sources, the NMOS and PMOS transistors are 
never made to operate in ON condition together. This was achieved by providing separate 
control signals to the gate of PMOS and NMOS transistors. The current flow in the coil can 
be monitored by measuring the voltage generated across the ‘current sense resistor’ (50 mΩ) 
that is in series with the coil. 
 
Figure 5-3 Optical interferometer setup 
Figure 5-2 shows the control signals supplied to the two transistors. The control 
signal for PMOS varies from +3.5V to -1V, while the NMOS control signal varies from -
3.5V to +1V. When the PMOS transistor receives a control voltage of  
+3.5V at its gate, the gate to source voltage (Vgs) of the PMOS becomes 0V, thus the 
PMOS transistor turns OFF. But, application of -1V to the PMOS transistor’s gate terminal 
turns the transistor ON, with a ‘Vgs’ of -4.5V. Under ‘ON’ condition, the transistor provides 
least amount of resistance to the current flow. The control voltages at which the NMOS 
transistor turns ON and OFF is exactly opposite to that of the PMOS transistor. Changing the 
magnitude of the control voltages will result in a change in the amplitude of the current 
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flowing to the coil. The control signals for the two transistors were synchronized to avoid 
simultaneous turning ON of PMOS and NMOS transistors. With the help of these 
synchronized control signals, the proposed circuit can generate magnetic fields in forward 
and reverse directions during distinct phases in time. 
In the control signal of PMOS transistor, Figure 5-2 shows three distinct phases. 
During the first phase, which is from 4.2 us to 7.2 us, the PMOS transistor was turned ON, 
thus charging the coil with a positive current, while the NMOS transistor was turned OFF. 
Magnetic field was generated in forward direction during this phase. During the second phase 
(from 7.2 us to 10.2 us), the PMOS transistor was turned OFF, while the NMOS transistor 
was turned ON, which results in the discharge of the magnetic energy stored in the coil, thus 
resulting in a magnetic field generated in the reverse direction. Finally, in the third phase 
(from 10.2 us to 13.8 us), the PMOS transistor was turned back ON, while the NMOS was 
turned OFF, thus generating a second magnetic field in the forward direction. 
The presence of forward (first phase) and reverse (second phase) magnetic field 
ensures that the MO material is magnetized and demagnetized faster, while the third phase 
generates an additional forward magnetic field to bring the MO material to its initial 
unmagnetized state. Thus, the proposed circuit can generate magnetic field in forward and 
reverse direction, with the freedom to change the strength as well as the duration of each of 
the magnetic fields. 
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Figure 5-4 Magnetic field generator circuit fabricated on a PCB 
5.3 Optical Interferometer Setup 
Sagnac interferometer setup utilizing MO material and magnetic field generator 
circuit is shown in Fig. 3. Sagnac interferometer was chosen due to its stability over different 
temperature ranges [56]. The MO material was placed inside a zirconia sleeve, with optical 
cables placed against its sides. MO material was placed at the center of the Sagnac loop to 
produce Faraday rotation to the optical signal, resulting in a change of SoP. This optical 
signal creates a constructive or destructive interference at the output port of the 3dB coupler, 
depending on the state of the MO material’s magnetization. The MO material used in this 
setup was a “Bismuth-doped rare-earth iron garnet thick film”, which had a thickness of 
470 m and provides a maximum of 45° Faraday rotation. This MO material was 
magnetized/demagnetized using a coil connected to the proposed circuit. 
The coil wrapped around the MO material has 5 turns with 4mm length and 1.6mm 
wire thickness. The strength of magnetic field (B) produced by this coil can be calculated by 
the following equation [58]: 
 𝐵 =  
𝜇𝑜𝑁𝐼
√𝑙2 + 4𝑅2
 (5-2) 
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Here, ‘N’ represents the number of turns in the coil, while ‘l’ and ‘R’ represents the 
length and radius of the coil, respectively. The magnitude of peak current flowing through 
the coil is represented by ‘I’. 
The optical interferometer setup receives power from a laser source with 1550nm 
wavelength. The output port of the coupler was connected to a power sensor, which converts 
optical signal into electrical signal to be monitored using oscilloscope. 
 
      (a) 
 
       (b) 
Figure 5-5  a) Current sense resistor’s voltage output. b) Normalized optical output. 
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5.4 Results and Discussion 
Figure 5-4 shows the proposed magnetic driver circuit fabricated on a PCB. Two 
SMA connectors were used to supply the control signal to the transistors, while another SMA 
connector was used to read the ‘current sense resistor’ voltage output. The current sense 
resistor output obtained from the fabricated circuit is shown in Figure 5-5a. The 
corresponding optical output measured from the power sensor of the interferometer setup is 
shown in Figure 5-5b. The rise/fall time of the optical output was ~500ns. The reason for the 
longer switching speed was due to the PMOS transistor (Infineon SPB80P06PG) used in this 
circuit had a very large gate capacitance of ~5nF. This resulted in a slowdown of the input 
control signal applied to the PMOS transistor. Also, the NMOS transistor (PSMN4R0-
30YLD) used in this circuit also had a large capacitance of ~1.2nF. For a desired 100ns rise 
time of control signal, with a source resistance of 50Ω, the input capacitance should be in the 
order of ~500pF. This requirement comes from the time constant equation for a (Resistor-
Capacitor) RC circuit: 
 𝜏 = 𝑅𝐶 (5-3) 
Rise/fall time of a RC circuit can be approximated to be ~5τ.  Thus, the control 
signals applied to the gate of the transistors would have had a rise/fall time of about ~1550 
ns, due to the large total input capacitance of 6.2nF (=5nF+1.2nF). The slow rising/falling 
control signals ultimately resulted in current pulses with longer rise/fall times.  
Figure 5-5a shows that the positive peak amplitude of the current sense resistor output 
was 0.55V, while the negative peak amplitude was -1.2V. We can calculate the 
corresponding peak current amplitude as 11A and -24A. The reason for the difference in the 
peak current levels arises from the difference in the PMOS and NMOS transistor 
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characteristics. As mentioned earlier, the peak positive or negative current amplitudes can be 
varied by changing the amplitude of the control voltages supplied to the corresponding 
transistors.  
Despite the shortcomings in the maximum switching speed of the control signals, the 
proposed circuit could achieve switching speeds in the order of ~500ns. Figure 5-5b shows 
that the optical output has a rise and fall time ~500ns and a pulse width of ~2 us.  Also, the 
optical output shows no perturbation in the signal when no magnetic field was applied to the 
MO material. The switching speed of the optical output can be improved significantly by 
using transistors with low input capacitances. 
It is important to note that the proposed circuit provides the freedom to control the 
magnitude as well as time period of each one of the three phases of the magnetic pulses to 
fine tune the optical output. Also, the third phase of the magnetic pulse is provided to aid the 
MO material reach a fixed state, at the end of each switching cycle, which would help fast 
magnetization in the next switching cycle. This way both the rise and the fall time of the 
optical signal can be improved. The proposed circuit will show a significant improvement in 
the fall time of latching MO materials, which needs a strong reverse magnetic field in order 
to be able to demagnetize quickly [57]. In future, the authors are planning to use transistors 
with low input capacitance to further improve the switching speed. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This work reports on a newly proposed circuit that can generate magnetic field in 
forward as well as reverse direction. The circuit provides the user with the freedom of fine 
tuning the magnitude and period of each magnetic pulses. This circuit has been used as the 
field generator in a Sagnac interferometer setup utilizing an MO material and the 
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experimental results prove that the switching speed of optical output can be improved with 
the help of magnetic fields generated from the proposed circuit.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this dissertation, the feasibility of low power IEMI attack techniques to inject false-
data into input and output signals of an embedded system, has been explored. It has been 
experimentally proved that the chosen analog sensor circuit, gets influenced by the induced 
time varying signal, due to AC to DC conversion phenomenon, which happens due to the 
non-linear properties of embedded systems. The experimental results prove that, it would be 
possible to arbitrarily increase or decrease the DC voltage seen by the ADC circuit, thereby 
corrupting the analog sensor’s output data. 
Also, the same non-linear properties of the embedded system’s input terminal, make them 
vulnerable to IEMI attacks, even if the sensors used by this system are fully digital. It had 
been previously assumed that digital signals are resilient to false data injection attack from 
IEMI attack techniques. But, the results shown in this dissertation proves otherwise and 
demand alternative options to detect and eliminate the false data injected because of this 
attack. 
Finally, the IEMI attack on digital actuators were also proven to be affected by false data 
injection into the control signal’s path. Experimental data presented in this dissertation shows 
that it is possible to disable the digital actuator from responding to any new control signal 
input, while also showing the feasibility of independently controlling the digital actuator, 
regardless of the control signal generated by an embedded system, using this attack 
technique. 
106 
 
6.1 Suggestions for future researchers 
Although the work discussed in this dissertation, highlights the potential threat posed 
by IEMI attack technique, there are lot more questions which needs to be answered, before 
considering this technique as a viable option for successful false data injection. The most 
important of which is, design of EM signal detection circuit, that can detect the digital signal 
transitions. This circuit would have to be integrated with the IEMI attacker circuits, to be 
able to inject false data in-phase with the digital signals present in the victim circuit. With 
successful integration of this circuit with the IEMI attacker’s system, the injected false data 
would be completely indistinguishable from the actual digital data, from the point of view of 
an embedded system. 
The second main concern which holds back IEMI attack technique from becoming 
main stream, is the portability of the attacker’s circuit. Currently the proposed circuits which 
were used to perform IEMI attacks on embedded systems were bulky and requires constant 
AC power supply from wall outlets, to sustain this attack. Ideally, an attacker’s circuit should 
be portable, at the least, it should be small enough to be carried inside a shoulder bag, with 
the entire circuit powered by portable battery power. To realize this portable circuit, the 
power transfer efficiency between attacker and the victim circuit must be improved, thereby 
reducing the power consumption of the attacker circuit. 
One of the key components to ensure maximum power transfer efficiency between 
the attacker and victim circuits would be the transmission of attack signal at the resonant 
frequency of the victim circuit. Currently, there are no direct method to determine the 
resonant frequency of the victim circuit, without experimentally sweeping the attack signal’s 
frequency over a range of frequencies and then use the output data of the embedded system, 
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in a controlled environment, to estimate the resonant frequency. Although, there are circuit’s 
like grid-dip-meter, which have been traditionally used to detect the resonant frequency of a 
receiver, the complexity of embedded circuits requires design of special techniques, to 
accurately determine the resonant frequency, thereby improving the efficiency of the IEMI 
attack technique. 
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